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THE JUSTICES AND THE GENERALS: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S




The Supreme Court's 2003 affirmative action decisions con-
tained an interesting development that on the surface had little to do
with minority rights in higher education. Among the friend-of-the-
Court briefs that the Supreme Court reviewed was one filed by two
dozen current and former high-ranking military officials. The "Bec-
ton brief' (so named after its lead amicus, Lt. Gen. Julius Becton)
urged the Court to safeguard the service academies' ability to engage
in affirmative action, on the grounds that the practice enabled the
creation and preservation of an integrated officer corps. The Court
was not only persuaded by this argument, but also regarded it as
crucial evidence supporting its reaffirmance of race-conscious admis-
sions and quoted from the Becton brief at length in Grutter v.
Bollinger.
The Court's reliance on-and implicit trust in-the military's
guidance is not at all surprising. Indeed, the Court has a long his-
tory of deferring to military judgment. While other litigants are often
required to submit proof of whatever assertions they are making before
the Court, the Justices invariably accept arguments put forth by the
military without subjecting them to constitutional scrutiny. Nonmil-
itary claimants typically have to persuade the Court that their evalu-
ation of what is proper in their particular field is consistent with
constitutional imperatives. By contrast, once the military informs the
Court of what is proper vis-d-vis the Armed Forces, the Court rarely
determines that this reasoned evaluation violates the Constitution.
While all litigants are granted presumptions of subject-matter exper-
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presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, in
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period encompassing the primary writing of this Article). Thanks are also due to the fol-
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Steven Puro, Susan Haire, Ron Nelson, and Helen Knowles for some important critiques;
and the political science faculties of St. Lawrence University and Elizabethtown College for
their suggestions about how to further refine this project.
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tise, only the military's subject-matter expertise is habitually shielded
from rigorous constitutional evaluation.
This Article will track this tradition of Supreme Court deference
to the military. It will be a systematic review of the relevant prece-
dents, one which will detail the circumstances in which the military
has typically been brought before the Court (or voluntarily appeared
as amicus), the military's "success rate" in persuading the Court,
and the philosophical patterns that emerge from the various
decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court reasserted the constitutionality, at least
conceptually, of affirmative action in higher education admissions in
the spring of 2003, much of the commentary focused on how both
the result reached and the reasoning deployed were a reflection of
the traditionally pragmatic jurisprudence of Justice Sandra Day
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (reiterating that the use of race in higher education admissions was not a per se
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; the specific program in Gratz, however, in which
minority candidates were automatically granted a fixed amount of "points" in the Univer-
sity of Michigan's admissions process, was found unconstitutional).
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O'Connor, who wrote the relevant opinions.2 A less noticed but still
important dimension of the University of Michigan affirmative action
cases is that they fit perfectly within another, wholly separate tradition.
Among the 170 friend-of-the-court briefs submitted in the two
cases was a brief submitted in Grutter v. Bollinger by twenty-nine deco-
rated military and government officials.' The brief-informally re-
ferred to as the "Becton brief' after Lt. Gen. Julius Becton, whose
name appeared first in the list-was filed in support of the University
and specifically asked the Supreme Court to uphold the practice of
race-conscious admissions. The officials' argument was not so much
about civil rights or even educational equality as it was about military
necessity. Invoking "the absolute imperative of integrating its officer
corps in furtherance of the compelling national security interest in an
effective military,"4 the Becton amici insisted that "[a]t present, the
military cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified
and racially diverse unless the service academies and the ROTC use
limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies."5
The Supreme Court was clearly persuaded by this line of argu-
ment and by this particular language, going so far as to include the
latter quotation in its opinion.6 While amicus briefs from other sec-
tors of American life (such as the corporate sphere) were referenced
in the Court's opinion for their arguments favoring race-conscious ad-
2. SeeJoan Biskupic, 2Justices'Influence Felt in Latest Term, USA TODAY, June 27, 2003,
at 4A ("Together, the rulings reflected a pragmatic conservatism on the court that stems
from O'Connor regularly joining forces with Rehnquist, her old Stanford law school class-
mate, but also breaking from him in significant ways that push the court toward the na-
tion's political center."); Sanford Levinson, Redefining the Center, VILLAGE VOICE (New
York),July 8, 2003, at 38 (arguing that recent affirmative action decisions "are best under-
stood in terms of how the court-and especially Justice O'Connor-perceives the current
American center of gravity on such matters"); Glenn C. Loury, Affirmed . . . For Now the
Supreme Court's Decision Made Affirmative Action Resoundingly Legal. Now Comes the Hard
Part-Making It Unnecessary, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2003, at D1 ("The first thing to note is
that the court's reasoning is pragmatic, not ideological. This is in sharp contrast to the
posture of most advocates on either side of the issue.").
3. The list includes two former Secretaries of Defense (William Cohen and William
Perry), three former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (William Crowe, John
Shalikashvili, and Hugh Shelton), three former Commanders in Chief of the U.S. Central
Command (Joseph Hoar, Norman Schwarzkopf, and Anthony Zinni), a former National
Security Advisor (Robert McFarlane), four U.S. Senators (Max Cleland, Bob Kerrey, Carl
Levin, and Jack Reed), and four former heads of the service academies (Daniel Christman
and Howard Graves, Military Academy; Joseph Prueher, Naval Academy; and Tad Oel-
strom, Air Force Academy).
4. Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents at 10, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516).
5. Id. at 5.
6. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331.
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missions, the Becton brief was among the few amicus briefs which
were directly quoted. And the Becton brief, from which Justice
O'Connor pulled five separate quotations, stood alone as the only
amicus brief quoted more than twice.7
That the Supreme Court would be especially swayed by argu-
ments made by military figures about matters of military policy is ut-
terly unremarkable. Indeed, the Court has a long history of deferring
to military judgment. While other litigants are often required to sub-
mit proof of whatever assertions they are making before the Court,
the Justices invariably accept arguments put forth by the military with-
out subjecting them to constitutional scrutiny. Nonmilitary claimants
typically have to persuade the Court that their evaluation of what is
proper in their particular field is consistent with constitutional imper-
atives. By contrast, once the military informs the Court of what is
proper vis-A-vis the U.S. Armed Forces, the Court rarely determines
that this reasoned evaluation violates the Constitution. While all liti-
gants are granted presumptions of subject-matter expertise, only the
military's subject-matter expertise is habitually shielded from rigorous
constitutional evaluation.
The Supreme Court's tradition of deference to the military has
been duly noted by scholars and commentators, but it has not really
been catalogued. This Article is the first step in that direction, a step
which will be followed by several others in the months and years
ahead. Its analysis is based on a comprehensive assembled listing of
all of the military cases that the Supreme Court has decided dating
back to World War I. The tandem goals of this Article are to systemat-
ically examine just how successful the military has been before the
Supreme Court and to extract from the cases the jurisprudential and
philosophical explanations for that success. The Article will close by
analyzing the Court's recent opinions in the Guantanamo detentions
within the context of the deferential tradition.
I. METHODOLOGY OF THIS PROJECT
Prominent accounts of the Supreme Court's tradition of defer-
ence to the military have analyzed the phenomenon in exclusively
7. Id. The only other amicus brief to be quoted more than once was the brief of the
United States. Out of 101 amicus briefs filed in Grutter, the Court quoted from or referred
to only eleven in its opinion. Counting Becton and the United States, the other nine
referenced amici were the dean of Georgetown Law School, Amherst College, the Ameri-
can Educational Research Center, the Association of American Law Schools, the Law
School Admission Council, the Harvard Black Law Students Association, the National Ur-
ban League, 3M, and General Motors Corp.
[VOL. 65:907
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chronological fashion.8 Although political development approaches
to understanding legal phenomena are usually preferable (especially
vis-a-vis the modification of doctrine), this Article utilizes a subject-
specific approach. Although scrutinizing every single fact pattern
within the Court's military jurisprudence is hopelessly unworkable, a
few of the most common recurring fact patterns are ideal jumping-off
points to asking and answering a series of broader questions:
* How successful is the military when it is a party before the
Supreme Court or when issues of military policy are litigated
before the Supreme Court?
* Is the success rate dependent upon the nature of the case?
" What, if any, subprinciples can we extract from the general
deference instinct?
The list of cases that appears in Appendix A was compiled by gen-
erating a master list using a series of Lexis searches9 and then review-
ing that list, case by case, to screen out false positives."0 Once the final
8. E.g., John F. O'Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine,
35 GA. L. REv. 161 (2000);Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1
(2002);Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sovereign Immu-
nity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2003); Jonathan Turley,
Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian
Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 649 (2002). Other treatments of the subject combine
something resembling an American political development approach with a more subject-
specific analytical construct. See, e.g., Earl F. Martin, Separating United States Service Members
from the Bill of Rights, 54 SYRACUSE L. REv. 599, 602 (2004) (organizing the Court's post-1969
work into "strong, moderate, and weak separate community cases").
9. The queries searched the headnotes of all Supreme Court cases from 1918 to the
present, looking for words such as "military," "armed forces," "army," "navy," "air force,"
'marines," and "coast guard." Any case that had any of these search terms appear even
once in the headnotes was flagged for my review.
10. The obvious apocryphal examples of a false positive generated by these searches
would have been a case involving an interstate shipment of Navy bean soup or a copyright
suit over the Elvis Costello song Oliver's Army (sadly, neither fact pattern was a real case).
Some false positives were very clear. The search terms picked up Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which referenced Harry Truman as the commander in
chief of the Armed Forces.
Others were not so obvious; they were cases that looked like they were going to count
but upon closer inspection did not. Perhaps the strangest example of this was Caldwell v.
Parker, in which a serviceman was convicted of murder by a civilian court in Alabama after
the local military authorities declined to court-martial him. 252 U.S. 376 (1920). The
military's surprising demurral made this an ordinary murder case, with no questions of
military policy at bar, and no litigants appearing in an official military capacity.
Some false positives required some nuanced decisionmaking. The issue in Hamilton v.
Regents of the University of California was whether students could be exempted from compul-
sory college courses in military science on the basis of religious objections. 293 U.S. 245
(1934). While the Court's decision to deny this exemption may shed some light on the
Court's philosophical posture in these cases, in the end it was decided that this case should
not count in the compilation of the military's success rate because the military itself was
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list of military cases had been assembled, each case was studied in
terms of the result achieved-did the military win or lose the case?-
and the reasoning used by the Court in arriving at this result.
The obvious question, then, is "what is a military case?" The crite-
ria were very simple. A case was identified as a military case if any one
of two factors were present: (1) questions of military policy or proce-
dure were before the Court or (2) the military was present as a party
to the litigation in some sort of official capacity. In other words, a soldier
accused of murdering a civilian does not satisfy the military-as-party
requirement, but a military tribunal attempting to try Nazi saboteurs
most definitely does.
There are a few other necessary explanations for decisions that
were made in the research design. This portion of the overall project
stopped at World War I simply to keep the caseload manageable at
present; one future undertaking will be an expansion of this analysis
to the years before 1918. Also excluded was a class of cases which at
first glance may have appeared to be quite relevant: disputes over vet-
erans' benefits. The reason these cases were not included in my final
tabulations is that the "military" litigants were not really military per-
sonnel; they were civilian bureaucrats, usually working for the Veter-
ans Administration. This has two implications. First, it means that the
Supreme Court could not be dazzled (or intimidated) by the presence
of military brass because there was no military brass in the room. Sec-
ond, it means that to the point that the civilian bureaucrats were im-
plementing military policy, they were doing so as officials who are
traditionally not entitled to deference from the Supreme Court."
For the same reasons, also omitted was the string of war-risk insur-
ance cases that emerged shortly after the outbreak of World War I and
persisted into the late 1930s. The insurance program was overseen by
the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, which was created in September of
1914.12 As with the Veterans Administration, then, the "military" party
in these cases was in fact a civilian agency, which means that these
not a party to the case and because much of the Court's reasoning turned on the Univer-
sity's status as a land grant college, which meant that it could be required to teach a variety
of subjects-including military science-as a condition of accepting the federal money. Id.
at 254. This placed the case a level far enough removed from the requirement that mili-
tary policy questions be before the Court to militate against its inclusion in the final list.
11. This is especially true of bureaucrats in comparison to members of Congress, who
generally get some degree of Supreme Court deference based on their elected status.
12. For a contemporary overview of the program, see Samuel McCune Lindsay, Purpose
and Scope of War Risk Insurance, 79 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 52 (1918).
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cases are generally not on point for the purposes of analyzing Su-
preme Court deference to military parties or policies. t3
There is also a technical problem. There were inevitably cases,
such as Wallace v. United States,14 in which the military could be said to
be on both sides of a legal dispute. In Wallace, a former colonel in the
Quartermaster Corps had filed suit for back pay, claiming that he had
been improperly removed from his position without the benefit of a
hearing when the president, as commander in chief, appointed some-
one else in his place. 15 In cases such as these, for the purposes of
determining whether the military has "won" or "lost" the case, a case
was coded as a military "win" if a preferred military policy was upheld
or if the chain of command was vindicated. Because the Supreme
Court in Wallace sided with the policy choice of the superior officer, in
this case the president,16 Wallace counts as a "win."17
13. One war risk insurance case, however, provides ample support in dicta for the def-
erence tradition. In United States v. Williams, the parents of a Navy seaman who was killed
were denied recovery on his war risk insurance policy because their son had cancelled the
policy, though he initially enlisted in the Navy while under the age of eighteen with his
parents' consent conditioned on the maintenance of the insurance policy. 302 U.S. 46, 47
(1937). Under the terms of the statute, minors between the ages of fourteen and eighteen
were competent to enlist with parental permission. Id. at 49. Justice Pierce Butler's lan-
guage for a unanimous Court recognized that the statute did not afford parents any right
to condition their consent and then starkly noted how the parents must subsequently fade
into the background in terms of the care of and authority over the child:
Enlistment is more than a contract; it effects a change of status. It operates to
emancipate minors at least to the extent that by enlistment they become bound to
serve subject to rules governing enlisted men and entitled to have and freely to
dispose of their pay. Upon enlistment of plaintiff's son, and until his death, he
became entirely subject to the control of the United States in respect of all things
pertaining to or affecting his service.
Id. at 49-50 (footnotes omitted).
14. 257 U.S. 541 (1922).
15. Id. at 542, 544.
16. The Court specifically held that the limits on the president's power to remove
Army officers did not apply when the president was simply appointing a new officer and
obtaining Senate confirmation for the new appointment. Id at 544.
17. It should also be pointed out that the tabulation of the military's win-loss record
omits intervening procedural and jurisdictional decisions that were handed down earlier in
a given litigation separate from the eventual decision on the merits. For example, in the
mid-1950s, the Court took on two separate cases in which the wife of an American military
official was accused of murdering her husband and initially subjected to a military court-
martial: Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956), and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
Preliminary Court rulings first had to establish the constitutionality of the relevant provi-
sions of the then-recently enacted Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Pub. L. No.
81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2000)); see infra
note 47. This procedural determination was done in Kinsella. 351 U.S. at 474-75. How-
ever, the following year, in Reid, the Court issued a ruling on the merits of the reach of
courts-martial, a ruling which covered both the Reid murder and the Krueger murder. Reid,
354 U.S. at 39-41. Because this project is tracking the military's ultimate success rate before
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Also not included in the tabulation of win-loss records were indi-
vidual Justice's orders which had accompanying explanations. At
times such orders were of an intermediate procedural nature; at other
times, the orders were simply one Justice hearing an application for a
stay of a ruling. These cases are referenced in the Appendix, but their
results are not part of the statistical dossier; only cases decided by the
Court sitting as a whole are tabulated in the win-loss record."8
Finally, it must be pointed out that there is a degree to which the
forthcoming analysis is going to be somewhat inexact. Just because
the military emerges victorious in a certain case does not mean that
their success was predicated on a semblance of Supreme Court defer-
ence to military prerogatives or expertise. For example, in ETSI Pipe-
line Project v. Missouri, the Court's rejection of the Secretary of the
Interior's claim that he had the power to sell water from an Army
reservoir for use in a coal slurry without first obtaining approval from
the Secretary of the Army was the result of jurisprudential analysis of
questions of statutory construction with no relation to the military def-
erence tradition. 19 However, these cases are more the exception than
rule.
II. THE DATA
From 1918 through 2004, up to and including the three Guanta-
namo cases, the Supreme Court has issued rulings in 178 military
cases.2 ' The military's record in these cases is 118 wins and 60 losses
for a success rate of 66.3%.21 A more detailed breakdown of the mili-
tary's success rate can be found in the Appendices; some of these
figures will be discussed shortly. For the moment, let us proceed to
some substantive analysis.
the Supreme Court, interim rulings are not counted. Consequently, Reid is included in the
data, but Kinsella is not.
18. A trio of orders filed in the lawsuit over the United States' bombing of Cambodia is
included in the tabulation in the Appendix, but cannot be coded as either a military win or
loss since they are intermediate procedural orders. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S.
1304, 414 U.S. 1316, and 414 U.S. 1321 (1973). Also included in the Appendix are four
additional procedural orders not counted in the tabulations: Lopez v. United States, 404 U.S.
1213 (1971) (ordering bail possibility for applicant for conscientious objector status); Peep-
les v. Brown, 444 U.S. 1303 (1979) (denying stay of discharge order sought by Navy seaman
discharged for sexual misconduct); Jones v. LeMond, 396 U.S. 1227 (1969) (granting stay to
AWOL conscientious objector claimant protesting confinement in Navy brig and ordering
him held in open restricted barracks instead); and Scaggs v. Larsen, 396 U.S. 1206 (1969)
(ordering a reservist contesting his renewal to be released on his own recognizance).
19. 484 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1988).
20. See infra app. A.
21. See infra app. B.
914 [VOL. 65:907
THE JUSTICES AND THE GENERALS
A. The Tradition of Deference: The Basics
To begin, it must be noted that the Supreme Court's tradition of
deference to the military is not something that needs to be inferred or
extracted via analysis. It is on the pages of Court opinions in explicit
concessional language. The Court's blunt use of the term in Mid-
dendorf v. Henry--"Dealing with areas of law peculiar to the military
branches, the Court of Military Appeals' judgments are normally enti-
tled to great deference"-is hardly atypical. 2 In Rostker v. Goldberg,
the Court confirmed that 'judicial deference ... is at its apogee when
legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and sup-
port armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is
challenged."2 3
This tradition has also undergone a subtle evolution. As John
O'Connor has pointed out, in the early days of the tradition, the Su-
preme Court's deferential posture took the form of what he called
"noninterference," in which the Court opted to screen off military
matters from judicial consideration entirely, engaging in a pointed
"refusal to conduct a substantive review, no matter how lenient, of
military practices."2 4 It was only later that the Court's approach took
on a more affirmatively deferential tone, in which the Court would
consider the military's position on a given subject and accord that
view significant weight in its own deliberations. Although the dura-
tion of this purported era of noninterference can certainly be de-
bated, 5 what cannot be debated is that over time, the Supreme Court
adopted an explicitly obeisant posture towards military judgment.
One of the most important components of the Court's tradition
of deference is the notion that the military stands as a society wholly
separate from civilian life. This notion has been given emphatic voice
on many occasions. As the Court stated in Orloff v. Willoughby, "[t]he
military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian."2 6 Similarly, the Court remarked
in Parker v. Levy, "[t] his Court has long recognized that the military is,
by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. We
22. 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976).
23. 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).
24. O'Connor, supra note 8, at 170.
25. O'Connor places its end in the 1950s. Id. at 193. However, in his institutional
history of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Jonathan Lurie noted that up
through the 1990s, "the contemporary attitude of both Congress and the U.S. Supreme
Court toward critical oversight of military justice [was] one of simple disinterest."
JONATHAN LURIE, MILITARYJUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED
FORCES, 1775-1980, at 320 (rev. & abr. ed. 2001).
26. 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
20061
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have also recognized that the military has, again by necessity, devel-
oped laws and traditions of its own during its long history. '2 7 And the
Court's comparison of military enlistment and a marriage contract in
In re Grimley is yet another example of the development of the separa-
tion principle:
Enlistment is a contract; but it is one of those contracts
which changes the status; and, where that is changed, no
breach of the contract destroys the new status or relieves
from the obligations which its existence imposes. Marriage is
a contract; but it is one which creates a status. Its contract
obligations are mutual faithfulness; but a breach of those ob-
ligations does not destroy the status or change the relation of
the parties to each other. The parties remain husband and
wife, no matter what their conduct to each other-no matter
how great their disregard of marital obligations....
By enlistment the citizen becomes a soldier. His rela-
tions to the State and the public are changed. He acquires a
new status, with correlative rights and duties; and although
he may violate his contract obligations, his status as a soldier
is unchanged. He cannot of his own volition throw off the
garments he has once put on, nor can he, the State not ob-
jecting, renounce his relations and destroy his status on the
plea that, if he had disclosed truthfully the facts, the other
party, the State, would not have entered into the new rela-
tions with him, or permitted him to change his status.28
The Court has not merely pressed for separation as a principle; it
has augmented its theorizing with some pragmatic rules and erected a
wall of separation between the military and civilian sectors. The most
prominent practical manifestation of the separation principle is the
Court's insistence that civilian courts lack capacity to review the deci-
sions of military tribunals. In Reaves v. Ainsworth, the Court stressed,
"[t]o those in the military or naval service of the United States the
military law is due process. The decision, therefore, of a military tri-
bunal acting within the scope of its lawful powers cannot be reviewed
or set aside by the courts. 29
27. 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
28. 137 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1890).
29. 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911). This seems to be the earliest pronouncement of this rule
in such explicit terms, although it has antecedents. SeeJohnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 114
(1895) ("All persons in the military or naval service of the United States are subject to the
military law; the members of the regular army and navy, at all times; the militia, so long as
they are in such service."); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 500 (1885) ("Courts martial form
no part of the judicial system of the United States, and their proceedings, within the limits
of theirjurisdiction, cannot be controlled or revised by the civil courts."); Dynes v. Hoover,
[VOL. 65:907
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The jurisdictional moat separating the military and workaday ci-
vilian parties and interests was also drawn in Ex parte Quiin,3 ° in which
eight accused Nazi saboteurs claimed the right to be tried in civilian
courts and not before a military tribunal. Rejecting their arguments
for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone explained
why habeas corpus was not appropriate for enemy combatants in time
of war:
By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a
distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful popu-
lations of belligerent nations and also between those who are
lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are sub-
ject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing
military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to
trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which
render their belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and
without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in
time of war, seeking to gather military information and com-
municate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who with-
out uniform comes secretly through the lines for the
purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are
familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed
not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be
offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punish-
ment by military tribunals.3"
Perhaps the starkest and most direct description of the relationship,
or lack thereof, between the Supreme Court and military law comes
from Burns v. Wilson:
Military law, like state law, is ajurisprudence which exists sep-
arate and apart from the law which governs in our federal
judicial establishment. This Court has played no role in its
development; we have exerted no supervisory power over the
courts which enforce it; the rights of men in the armed
61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857) ("Congress has the power to provide for the trial and
punishment of military and naval offences in the manner then and now practiced by civi-
lized nations; and that the power to do so is given without any connection between it and
the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed,
that the two powers are entirely independent of each other."); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 331, 337 (1806) ("It follows, from this opinion, that a court martial has no juris-
diction over ajustice of the peace, as a militiaman; he could never be legally enrolled: and
it is a principle, that a decision of such a tribunal, in a case clearly without its jurisdiction,
cannot protect the officer who executes it. The court and the officer are all trespassers.").
30. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
31. Id. at 30-31 (footnotes omitted).
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forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overrid-
ing demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are
not the agencies which must determine the precise balance
to be struck in this adjustment.32
However, this principle also works in reverse, as the Court has condi-
tioned its willingness to defer to the military in repeated reminders
that the military's rules for courts-martial have certain limits. In
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles," an airman who was accused of
committing a murder in Korea while still in the service was hauled
before a court-martial in Asia five months after his honorable dis-
charge from the Air Force. Invalidating the court-martial, Justice
Hugo Black held that the discharge made the airman a civilian un-
reachable by military discipline, reasoning that a post-discharge court-
martial served no military purpose: "Unlike courts, it is the primary
business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should
the occasion arise. But trial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely
incidental to an army's primary fighting function." 4
32. 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (footnotes omitted). Still another good example is Rogers
v. United States, in which an Army major contesting his forced retirement appealed to the
Supreme Court and claimed that the military tribunal hearing his challenge to the retire-
ment orders improperly refused to let him offer certain testimony. 270 U.S. 154, 161
(1926). The tribunal's apparent refusal, which would have been completely out of place in
a civilian court, was supported by military law, and the Court rejected Rogers's argument to
void those rules. Id. at 162. Chief Justice (and former president) William Howard Taft
wrote for a unanimous Court:
It is argued to us that the attitude of the court was in effect and as a matter of
military law a military order preventing the submission of further evidence and
making it a military offence for the plaintiff to have insisted on introducing his
witnesses. Were the matter important, we should have difficulty in yielding to
such a view.
Id. Chief Justice Taft applied a spoonful of sugar, of sorts, to this harsh dismissal, further
supporting his argument by noting that Rogers's attorneys had ample opportunity to pro-
test the procedures being followed by the tribunal during the actual hearing and opted not
to do so. Id. This parceling of blame to marginally competent counsel seems to have
enabled Chief Justice Taft to rescue the opinion from being an overt rhetorical statement
that the military can run its affairs however it sees fit; that this is the practical meaning of
the opinion, however, cannot be gainsaid.
33. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
34. Id. at 17. This logic, however, was not operating in United States ex. ret. Hirshberg v.
Cooke, when Justice Black denied the Navy the right to court-martial a seaman who had
mistreated Japanese prisoners of war. 336 U.S. 210 (1949). The mistreatment had oc-
curred during Hirshberg's wartime service. ld. at 211. He was subsequently granted an
honorable discharge upon expiration of his enlistment and then immediately reenlisted
the day after his honorable discharge; his offense was not discovered until his second pe-
riod of enlistment. Id. To allow for Hirshberg's court-martial would have served a valid
military purpose, and there is no question that the Navy had the requisite military author-
ity over him. Id. at 212-13. ButJustice Black held to a literal reading of a discharge as the
equivalent to the expiration of a statute of limitation. Id. at 213.
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Two years later, in Reid v. Covert,35 the Supreme Court invalidated
the military's attempt to try via court-martial the wife of an Air Force
sergeant after she was accused of murdering her husband while they
were stationed overseas. The rule that courts-martial have no peace-
time jurisdiction over the dependents of military personnel while ac-
companying them overseas was reaffirmed in Kinsella v. United States ex
rel. Singleton.36 The rule was also extended to bar trial by military tri-
bunal of civilian employees of the Armed Forces who commit crimes
while overseas in McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo7 and
Grisham v. Hagan.3
8
During this period, there was a brief and controversial foray by
the Court into micromanagement of the jurisdiction of military tribu-
nals. On July 20, 1956, an Army sergeant stationed at Fort Shafter in
Oahu, Hawaii, broke into a woman's hotel room and attempted to
rape her. 9 At the time of the attack, the sergeant was off the post on
an evening pass and dressed in civilian clothes.4 ° He was court-mar-
tialed, but appealed his conviction in civilian court, claiming that the
military had no power to court-martial him for a nonmilitary of-
fense.41 In a break with preexisting practice, the Supreme Court de-
clared in O'Callahan v. Parker that military tribunals could not try
service personnel for crimes that were not service-related, as long as
they were committed during peacetime.42 Just as civil courts have no
competence to decide military matters, military courts had no compe-
tence to decide civilian matters.
While the O'Callahan rule was certainly a furtherance of the sepa-
ration principle, it was hardly deferential to the military to suggest
that it had to stay confined to its cage. In fact, as he highlighted Toth
and Covert, Justice William 0. Douglas offered up one of the rare in-
stances in which the Supreme Court has been openly critical of mili-
tary practice:
[C] ourts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in deal-
ing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law. Article 134,
already quoted, punishes as a crime "all disorders and ne-
glects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces." Does this satisfy the standards of vagueness as
35. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
36. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
37. 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
38. 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
39. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1969).
40. Id. at 259.
41. Id. at 260-61.
42. Id. at 273-74.
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developed by the civil courts? It is not enough to say that a
court-martial may be reversed on appeal. One of the bene-
fits of a civilian trial is that the trap of Article 134 may be
avoided by a declaratory judgment proceeding or otherwise.
A civilian trial, in other words, is held in an atmosphere con-
ducive to the protection of individual rights, while a military
trial is marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive
justice.45
There was a practical limit to Justice Douglas's contumacy: the Court
shortly held in Gosa v. Mayden44 that the O'Callahan rule was not to be
applied retroactively.
Eventually, however, the Court reverted to a more cooperative
embrace of the separate society principle and abandoned Justice
Douglas's curmudgeonly approach. In 1987, the Court discarded the
O'Callahan rule in Solorio v. United States,45 holding that the military
did indeed have the power to court-martial service personnel even for
offenses that were not service-related. Building on Rostker's language
of deference, Chief Justice William Rehnquist reestablished the Su-
preme Court's laissez faire approach to military justice and did so by
noting civilian courts' lack of competence in the area:
The notion that civil courts are "ill equipped" to establish
policies regarding matters of military concern is substanti-
ated by experience under the service connection ap-
proach. . . . In fact, within two years after O'Callahan, this
Court found it necessary to expound on the meaning of the
decision, enumerating a myriad of factors for courts to weigh
in determining whether an offense is service connected.
Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U.S. 355
(1971). Yet the service connection approach, even as eluci-
43. Id. at 265-66 (citation omitted). It should be pointed out that to a certain extent,
Justice Douglas was following the example set by his great friend Justice Black, who had
raised similar concerns in Toth, albeit in less vituperative fashion:
There are dangers lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided by
the Bill of Rights and Article III of our Constitution. Free countries of the world
have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowestjurisdiction deemed abso-
lutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service.
United States ex reL Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955). And of course, doubts about
of the fairness of military tribunals-arguably one of America's more underrated founding
principles-have frequently been voiced by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866) (noting that trial by military tribunal does not satisfy the
Constitutional guarantee of right to trial by jury).
44. 413 U.S. 665 (1973).
45. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
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dated in Relford, has proved confusing and difficult for mili-
tary courts to apply.46
The segregation of military and civilian law is further shown by
the existence of appellate courts put in place for the exclusive pur-
pose of deciding appeals from military proceedings. The United
States Court of Military Appeals (COMA) was created in 1950 as a
provision in the new Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ);47 the
Court was renamed the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF) in 1994.48 Cases from these courts are currently eligible for
the certiorari process, but that is a recent development. Direct ap-
peals from COMA were not statutorily authorized until a 1983 amend-
ment to the UCMJ;49 prior to this amendment, military convictions
could only be appealed indirectly via collateral attack through civilian
courts. 50  Consequently, the Supreme Court's docket from these
courts has been sharply limited. As of 2004, the Supreme Court has
decided only eight cases appealed to it from COMA or CAAF.
An added explanation for the paucity of Supreme Court cases
which emerge from CAAF and COMA is that appeals in these courts
can only commence after all options for military justice and appeals
have been exhausted. This general rule, based on a principle of ad-
ministrative law, was a prominent consideration in Falbo v. United
States,51 in which a minister accorded conscientious objector status
who had subsequently refused to perform the alternative duties im-
posed on him by his local draft board attempted to obtain pre-induc-
tion judicial review of the sanction imposed upon him. Justice Black
46. Id. at 448 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983)).
47. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) (codified
as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2000)). The UCMJ was drafted pursuant to a sweep-
ing call for reform that accompanied the return of World War II veterans to civilian life;
having been exposed during the war to military justice, many veterans called for an over-
haul of a process that they had often seen abused. Walter T. Cox III, The Army, the Courts,
and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice, 118 MIL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1987). Another
factor in the creation of the UCMJ was the existence of separate disciplinary codes for the
Army and the Navy. Id. For an account of the creation of the UCMJ, see id.
48. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Establishment of the Court, http://
www.armfor.uscourts.gov/Establis.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2006). In terms of their consti-
tutional situs, these military appellate courts (as well as the military trial courts which were
also created) are Article I courts which were created pursuant to congressional authority
and not Article III courts considered part of the judicial branch per se. Cox, supra note 47,
at 15.
49. Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393 (1983) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
50. Cox, supra note 47, at 20.
51. 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
2006]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
held that such review was unavailable; Falbo first had to submit to in-
duction and take his appeal through the existing military channels.
5 2
In extending the rule beyond its administrative beginnings, the
Court further emphasized both the distinctive nature of military life
and underscored its own desire to allow the military maximum free-
dom to adjudicate its own affairs. In 1950, in Gusik v. Schilder,5 Justice
Douglas held for a unanimous Court that military prisoners should
not be allowed to file habeas corpus petitions unless they had tried
and failed to secure all existing military remedies. In 1969, in Noyd v.
Bond, the Court reiterated the practical wisdom of this rule through
Justice John Harlan:
Petitioner emphasizes that in the present case we are not
called upon to review prematurely the merits of the court-
martial proceeding itself. Instead, we are merely asked to de-
termine the legality of petitioner's confinement while he is
exercising his right of appeal to the higher military courts. It
is said that there is less justification for deference to military
tribunals in ancillary matters of this sort. We cannot agree.
All of the reasons supporting this Court's decision in Gusik v.
Schilder, supra, are applicable here. If the military courts do
vindicate petitioner's claim, there will be no need for civilian
judicial intervention. Needless friction will result if civilian
courts throughout the land are obliged to review comparable
decisions of military commanders in the first instance. More-
over, if we were to reach the merits of petitioner's claim for
relief pending his military appeal, we would be obliged to
interpret extremely technical provisions of the Uniform
Code which have no analogs in civilian jurisprudence, and
which have not even been fully explored by the Court of Mil-
itary Appeals itself. There seems little reason to blaze a trail
on unfamiliar ground when the highest military court stands
ready to consider petitioner's arguments.5 4
B. Three Isolated Cases
The Supreme Court's instinct to let the military govern itself has
manifested in a variety of cases and fact patterns, some of which recur
frequently. While these clusters of recurring fact patterns will be espe-
cially useful in determining the contours of the Supreme Court's def-
erential tradition (and will be examined momentarily), valuable
52. Id. at 554-55.
53. 340 U.S. 128 (1950).
54. 395 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1969).
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insight can be gleaned from certain isolated cases in which military
interests emerged victorious from direct conflict with crucial civil lib-
erties that the Supreme Court had historically defended with vigor.
Goldman v. Weinbergeri is perhaps the most blatant example of
the Supreme Court deferring to military policy at the expense of im-
portant civil liberties. Captain S. Simcha Goldman, a clinical psychol-
ogist and ordained rabbi, was fulfilling his obligations under the
Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program by submitting
to active military duty, serving as a psychologist at the mental health
clinic at March Air Force base in California.56 In April 1981, after
Goldman testified as a defense witness at a court-martial hearing while
wearing his yarmulke, the hospital commander sent him a notice re-
minding him that an Air Force regulation prohibited the wearing of
headgear while indoors and ordering him not to wear his yarmulke
outside the hospital. 7 After Goldman protested this order to the Air
Force general counsel, the hospital commander, in a seemingly vin-
dictive gesture, modified the order so that it forbade Goldman from
wearing his yarmulke even in the hospital and specifically warned him
that failure to comply would result in a court-martial. 8
Although there was little question that the regulation was a signif-
icant impediment to Goldman's ability to freely exercise his religion
(and by 1986, the Supreme Court had developed a sizable record of
knocking down regulations that had this effect), the Supreme Court
rejected Goldman's argument that the no-headgear regulation consti-
tuted a violation of his First Amendment right to freely exercise his
religion.5 ' They did so by doing something that they had rarely done
in the context of the Free Exercise Clause: they balanced away the
right as against a more important governmental concern.6 °
The fact that Goldman's free exercise rights were being op-
pressed (and in what at least in part appeared to be in retaliatory fash-
ion) did not escape the Court's notice.61 Nevertheless, the Court
subordinated Goldman's rights to the military's self-professed interest
55. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
56. Id. at 504-05.
57. Id. at 505.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 510.
60. See id. at 509-10. Up to this point, the only other time that the Court had balanced
away a free exercise right was United States v. Lee, when the Court turned down the claim of
an Old Order Amish employer to be broadly exempt from federal taxation. 455 U.S. 252
(1982).
61. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 510-11 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the religious sig-




in uniformity. The Court first justified this decision by subordinating
their own judgment to that of the military:
Our review of military regulations challenged on First
Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitu-
tional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civil-
ian society. The military need not encourage debate or
tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is required
of the civilian state by the First Amendment; to accomplish
its mission the military must foster instinctive obedience,
unity, commitment, and esprit de corps.62
The Court then operationalized this deference by uncritically endors-
ing the military's pronouncements:
The considered professional judgment of the Air Force is
that the traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized
uniforms encourages the subordination of personal prefer-
ences and identities in favor of the overall group mission.
Uniforms encourage a sense of hierarchical unity by tending
to eliminate outward individual distinctions except for those
of rank. The Air Force considers them as vital during peace-
time as during war because its personnel must be ready to
provide an effective defense on a moment's notice; the nec-
essary habits of discipline and unity must be developed in
advance of trouble.63
62. Id. at 507.
63. Id. at 508. A contemporary controversy which reaches back at least to the 1970s
may shed additional light on the treatment of Captain Goldman. The Air Force Acad-
emy-and thus by extension the Air Force proper-has long been a hotbed of evangelical
Christianity with nonevangelical Christian cadets reporting that they are subjected to cam-
paigns of proselytizing and non-Christian cadets claiming to be targets of harassment and
bigotry. T.R. Reid, Critic of Evangelicals Relieved of Air Force Post, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14,
2005, at A2. In the summer of 2004, the Academy brought a task force from Yale Divinity
School to observe cadet orientation, and the task force emphatically confirmed the
charges. Id. "What we found was this very strong evangelical Christian voice just dominat-
ing. We thought that just didn't make sense in light of their mission, which was to protect
and train cadets, not to win religious converts," noted task force member Kristen Leslie.
Id. A 1977 academy graduate who was Jewish asserted that he was a victim of this kind of
treatment in his cadet days. Id. Even more disturbingly, in May of 2005, a Lutheran Air
Force chaplain who corroborated with the conclusions of the "Yale Report" was summarily
relieved of her duties. Id. The Air Force subsequently issued new guidelines that seemed
to clamp down on proselytizing, to the consternation of Christian groups and many mem-
bers of Congress, only to water down the restrictions within months. Alan Cooperman, A
Noisy Takeoff for Air Force Guidelines on Religion, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2005, at A20; Alan
Cooperman, Air Force Eases Rules on Religion, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2006, at A5.
If these various reports are true-and the sheer quantum of available evidence seems
to suggest that there is at least some truth to them-then the crackdown on Captain
Goldman's yarmulke may not have been a benign attempt to enforce a military uniform
policy, but rather one manifestation of the overt religious bias (which included anti-Semi-
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The Free Exercise Clause is not the only First Amendment right
that was forced to take a back seat to military policy. The Supreme
Court opted to let purported military necessity trump freedom of
speech in United States v. O'Brien,64 upholding the six-year prison term
handed out to a Vietnam War protestor who had burned his draft
card on the steps of the South Boston courthouse. At the time of
David O'Brien's appeal, there was an open question as to whether he
had engaged in actual "speech" at all by burning his draft card; critics
of the very concept of "symbolic speech" were legion and included in
their ranks Chief Justice Earl Warren. O'Brien's "victory," such as it
was, was in persuading the Court that expressive conduct could qualify
for First Amendment shelter,6 5 even to the point of getting Chief Jus-
tice Warren to write the opinion. His victory was most certainly Pyr-
rhic, however, as Chief Justice Warren held that O'Brien had indeed
been "speaking," but that military imperatives trumped his speech.66
Chief Justice Warren's four-part test for expressive conduct was a
compromise-allowing such conduct to enjoy the protective benefits
of the Free Speech Clause while simultaneously allowing those bene-
fits to be abrogated under appropriate circumstances.6 7 Given the
elasticity of the test, the fact of O'Brien's defeat is not remarkable.
What is remarkable, however, is the reason for his defeat, an explana-
tion which serves to further highlight the degree of Supreme Court
acquiescence to military judgment.
The new test for symbolic speech required the government to
put forth an "important or substantial" interest justifying the regula-
tion in dispute and further required that this interest be "unrelated to
the suppression of free expression. " " The interest that the govern-
ment cited in its prosecution of O'Brien was the need to have the
Selective Service system operate efficiently, and a component of this
interest was a requirement that registrants have their draft cards on
their persons at all times. In an already extraordinary display of defer-
tism) that has apparently infested the Air Force for decades. This would mean that
Goldman v. Weinberger stands, much like United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), as an
instance in which the Supreme Court's uncritical deference to the military's claims abetted
the concealment of outright official misconduct. See infra notes 110-113 and accompany-
ing text.
64. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
65. Id. at 376.
66. Id. at 377.
67. In the most obvious illustration of the need for some sort of balancing act, to say
that symbolic speech was just as resistant to regulation as actual speech could conceivably





ence, the Court accepted the contention that the bureaucratic effi-
ciency of the system would be hampered if this requirement were not
in force.
To describe the arguments justifying this conclusion as specious
rationalizations would be derogatory to specious rationalizations.69
But it was not only the logic of the justification that was deeply flawed;
the very fact that the Court was even entertaining such arguments was
astonishingly disingenuous and even contradictory.
The problem lay in the Court's new requirement that a chal-
lenged regulation not be an attempt to stifle political expression, ei-
ther in obvious form or hidden behind some procedural disguise.
And there was little question that the Draft Card Mutilation Act of
1965-the law that criminalized the action David O'Brien under-
took-was overtly censorial. The evidence was right there in the Con-
gressional Record. The legislation's sponsor in the House of
Representatives, L. Mendel Rivers (who was the chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee), flatly stated on the floor of the
House that the bill was
a straightforward clear answer to those who would make a
mockery of our efforts in South Vietnam by engaging in the
mass destruction of draft cards.
.... [I]f it can be proved that a person knowingly de-
stroyed or mutilated his DRAFT CARD, then... he can be sent
to prison, where he belongs. This is the least we can do for
our men in South Vietnam fighting to preserve freedom,
while a vocal minority in this country thumb their noses at
their own Government.70
The bill's Senate co-sponsor, Strom Thurmond, likewise made it plain
that the new legislation was aimed at more than flamboyant protest; it
was inspired by general distaste for political dissent: "[D] efiance of the
warmaking powers of the Government.. . should not and must not be
tolerated by a society whose sons, brothers, and husbands are giving
their lives in defense of freedom. '71
The comments of the Draft Card Mutilation Act's sponsors thus
revealed an unequivocally censorial motive behind the legislation and
69. One of the silliest justifications proferred was the notion that "in a time of national
crisis, reasonable availability to each registrant of the two small cards assures a rapid and
uncomplicated means for determining his fitness for immediate induction, no matter how
distant in our mobile society he may be from his local board." Id. at 379. This apparently
meant that having the card handy obviated the burdensome requirement of asking some-
one to defend themself against an invasion force advancing from up the street.
70. 111 CONG. REC. 19871, 19871 (1965).
71. 111 CONG. REc. 20433, 20433 (1965).
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accordingly represented patent violations of multiple prongs of the
new O'Brien test. Yet the Court opted to disregard these stated inten-
tions, cavalierly suggesting that legislative debate is fundamentally ir-
relevant to the purpose of divining the intent behind an
unambiguously worded law:
[W]e are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled
criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer
than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What moti-
vates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not
necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and
the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.v2
This was wholesale disingenuousness because the Court possessed as a
matter of record the boastfully repressive objectives of the legislation's
drafters and not merely the lonely rantings of a few overwrought
commentators.73
Consequently, it is just about impossible to avoid the conclusion
that the Court simply did not want O'Brien to get away with his pro-
test, to the extent that they were prepared to completely contradict
themselves within the space of a few pages. United States v. O'Brien thus
went beyond mere deference to military prerogative; the Supreme
Court transformed itself into an offensive weapon designed to sub-
stantively ward off any critics of military procedures and perhaps of
military policy initiatives as well.7"
Military deference also led the Court to temper its zeal to protect
the rights of racial minorities in Chappell v. Wallace.75 Five naval en-
listed men charged that their commanding officer and several depu-
ties had taken their race into account when meting out discipline,
assigning shipboard duties, and compiling performance evaluations.7 6
The lawsuit they brought was a so-called "Bivens action," named for
the Supreme Court's ruling in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
72. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 384.
73. Indeed, calling this tactic disingenuous is to be rather kind to the Supreme Court
in comparison with other more notable observers. Rodney Smolla has blasted this move as
"sheer hypocrisy." RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 61 (1992); see also
LUCAS A. PoWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 328 (2000) (describing
O'Brien as "one of the most shameful moments of the Warren court").
74. The fact that they were also prepared to uphold an unusually harsh sentence (at six
years, O'Brien's sentence was considerably longer than the one to three years typically
meted out to someone who refused induction) further underscores just how committed
the Court was in its alliance with the military. PowE, supra note 73, at 326-27. O'Brien
would serve two years of his sentence before being released. Id.
75. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
76. Id. at 297.
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the Federal Bureau of Narcotics77 that damages suits may be brought
against federal officials accused of violating someone's civil rights, de-
spite the fact that Congress had not specifically authorized such law-
suits. As we have seen, the concept of congressional authorization is a
key proponent of the Court's traditional military deference. Congres-
sional intent to give the military leeway to operate has often been
cited by the Court as a central justification for its posture towards mili-
tary parties and procedures. This meant that the Bivens principle
(courts may assert jurisdiction even without explicit congressional per-
mission) 78 was in conflict with the Court's history on the jurisdiction
of civilian courts in military matters (civilian courts, lacking explicit
congressional permission to assert jurisdiction over courts-martial and
other military proceedings, may not do so).
Unsurprisingly, the Bivens principle gave way, unanimously. The
Court reminded the enlisted men of its hedge in Bivens that such law-
suits might not be available in the event of "special factors counselling
hesitation."7 9 Legislative (and judicial) intention to give the military
maximum freedom to operate, of course, constituted one such special
factor.8 ° The Court pointed out that it had counseled hesitation in
Feres v. United States,8 ' forbidding soldiers injured during military ser-
vice from bringing tort actions to recover damages for their wounds.
The reasons to bar such suits in Feres were no less applicable in
Chappell:
[C] onduct in combat inevitably reflects the training that pre-
cedes combat; for that reason, centuries of experience have
developed a hierarchical structure of discipline and obedi-
ence to command, unique in its application to the military
establishment and wholly different from civilian patterns. Ci-
vilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before en-
tertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the
established relationship between enlisted military personnel
and their superior officers; that relationship is at the heart
of the necessarily unique structure of the Military
Establishment.8 2
77. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
78. Id. at 397.
79. Id. at 396.
80. Chappel4 462 U.S. at 305.
81. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
82. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300.
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C. Substantive Clusters
As mentioned earlier, however, there are several clusters of recur-
ring cases which provide an especially illuminating look at the Court's
relationship with the military. Two clusters in particular represent ar-
eas in which the military is anomalously unsuccessful in the Supreme
Court. When these two clusters, totaling fifty-one cases, are removed
from the overall tabulations, the military's win-loss record is 95-32 for
a success rate of 74.8%.
1. The Conscientious Objector and Draft Exemption Cases.-Thirty-
three out of the 179 military cases the Supreme Court has decided
since 1918 deal with attempts by potential draftees to be exempted
from military service, either as conscientious objectors or pursuant to
a specific statutory exemption (such as a student deferment or a
clergy exception). These cases are one of two areas in which the mili-
tary's rate of success is well below its normal rate. While the military's
overall success rate is over sixty-six percent, in the cases in which a
potential draftee sought an exemption from military service, the mili-
tary lost more than it won-going 16-17 (48.5%)."
The exemption cases can be grouped into two subcategories: (1)
disputes over the procedures governing hearings to determine exemp-
tion status8 4 and (2) disputes over the contours of exemption policy-
who gets to claim status as a conscientious objector or other exempt
registrant and why they are so entitled. Only eight of the thirty-seven
cases are classified in this second category.85 As it turns out, there is
no variation in the two subcategories: the military went 12-13 (48.0%)
in the procedure cases, and 4-4 (50.0%) in the policy cases.86
While the exemption cases are an area in which the military ap-
pears to take it on the chin much more often than it does in other
cases, there is a significant catch to these rulings. Most of these cases
do not really involve the military per se, but rather local draft boards
made up of local members of the community far removed from the
hierarchy of military policymaking. Although theoretically governed
by a set of military-promulgated rules, these boards based their deci-
sions not on notions of military wisdom, but rather on workaday polit-
ics. This in turn meant that attitudinally, individual members of the
board (who had often volunteered for this responsibility out of per-
sonal enthusiasm for the military and for whatever military initiative
83. See infra app. B.
84. These cases are a haze of procedural variations.
85. See infra app. B.
86. See infra app. B.
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was being contemporarily prosecuted) were usually at philosophical
daggers drawn with the registrants that appealed to them for leni-
ency. 7 At times, the local boards were at times petty and vengeful,
such as in Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 11,88 when
a Cheyenne, Wyoming board revoked the draft exemption of a divin-
ity student who returned his draft card in protest of the Vietnam War.
Holding that the student could not have his exemption revoked (and
was entitled to appeal the revocation without having to submit for in-
duction and begin habeas corpus proceedings), Justice Douglas
acerbically described the Cheyenne board's actions:
We deal with conduct of a local Board that is basically law-
less. It is no different in constitutional implications from a
case where induction of an ordained minister or other
clearly exempt person is ordered (a) to retaliate against the
person because of his political views or (b) to bear down on
him for his religious views or his racial attitudes or (c) to get
him out of town so that the amorous interests of a Board
member might be better served. 9
Thus, although the basic data generated by the exemption cases
seems to show a limit to the Supreme Court's deference to the military
(based on the military's comparatively poor win-loss record in these
cases), there is ample reason to suggest that this data may be
misleading.
2. The Soldier Pay Cases.-The second group of cases in which
the military suffers an inordinate number of Supreme Court losses is
the cluster of eighteen disputes about soldier pay. There are a variety
of different fact patterns within this cluster, e.g., requests for back pay,
longevity pay allowances, and salary level. The military won just seven
of these eighteen cases (38.9%).'o
One of the more unusual aspects of this cluster is the chronology.
Just as there was an explosion of conscientious objector cases during
the Vietnam Era, there was a rash of soldier pay cases in the 1920s;
87. It was only later in the Vietnam War (or after it) that people began volunteering for
draft boards because of their antiwar sentiments, attempting to insinuate themselves into
the machinery of war as a means of ending it or avoiding it altogether. Matthew L. Wald,
New Draft Boards: Diversity Is Greater Than in 1960's, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1982, at Al.
For a good account of the experiences of conscientious objectors, see GERALD R. GioC-
LIO, DAYS OF DECISION: AN ORAL HISTORY OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE MILITARY
DURING THE VIETNAM WAR (1989).
88. 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
89. Id. at 237.
90. See infra app. B.
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fourteen of the eighteen soldier pay cases were decided between 1923
and 1929.91 However, unlike the increase in conscientious objector
cases during Vietnam (which have a logical explanation), there does
not appear to be a satisfying explanation for the concentration of sol-
dier pay cases around this particular time period. My initial research
into this phenomenon has come up empty, leading to nothing other
than the inferable fact that military paymasters were simply acting in a
miserly fashion at this particular time in history. Some of the mili-
tary's maneuvers, in fact, would have made Ebenezer Scrooge blush.
In United States v. Slaymaker9 2 the government tried to charge a naval
reservist for the cost of his uniform when he left the reserves and
joined the Navy proper. In Unites States v. Royer,"3 an Army officer who
had been officially promoted to the rank of captain was inadvertently
designated a major by his commanding officer; after the officer dis-
charged the customary duties of a major for four months, the error
was discovered and an actual promotion to major was initiated, along
with a demand for four months of overpaid wages (the difference be-
tween the captain's salary Royer should have been drawing and the
major's salary he was paid) that were disbursed only because of the
military's own errors.
Absent any other explanation for the military's behavior in these
cases, and factoring in the Court's more laconic style in opinion-writ-
ing in this era (which means much less comment on military interests
and prerogatives), definitive conclusions about the broad significance
of this cluster of cases are hard to find, and the implications of the
military's comparatively weaker success rate on the overall concept of
the Supreme Court's deferential tradition are merely inferential.
3. The Reach of Courts-MartiaL.-By contrast, there is much that
can be learned from the thirty-nine cases dealing with courts-martial
and other military tribunals that were decided between 1918 and
1999."4 The military's win-loss record in these cases is 29-10 (74.4%),
a significantly better rate than their overall success rate of 66.3%." 5
However, when the abovementioned two clusters in which the military
was anomalously unsuccessful are removed from the overall rate, the
91. Only two such cases were decided after Pearl Harbor, none since 1974.
92. 263 U.S. 94 (1923).
93. 268 U.S. 394 (1925).
94. Because these cases will be used as a means of explaining the decisions in the three
recent enemy combatant cases, those recent cases have been omitted from the tabulation
within this cluster.
95. See infra app. B.
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military's success rate rises to 74.8%, which makes the court-martial
cases an almost exact match with the military's adjusted "normal" rate.
A further distinction can be drawn between the military's at-
tempts to exercise court-martial or tribunal jurisdiction over military
personnel and attempts to exercise such jurisdiction over civilians (ei-
ther civilian employees of the military or dependents of military per-
sonnel). There are five instances of the latter-Duncan v.
Kahanamoku,96 Madsen v. Kinsella,97 Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Single-
ton,98 McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo,99 and Grisham v. Ha-
gan°° -and the military lost four of those cases, emerging victorious
only in their attempt in Madsen to haul a woman who had in 1949
murdered her husband, an Air Force lieutenant, before the Occupa-
tion Court in Germany.' 1 This means that the military's record
before the Supreme Court when its attempts to court-martial military
personnel are challenged is 28-6 for an astonishing success rate of
82.4%.
Theoretically, the Court's eventually-abandoned nondeferential
decision in O'Callahan could also be accommodated as a further in-
stance of a potentially misleading military defeat, but that would be
both unwise and unnecessary. It would be unwise because the fact of
the eventual O'Callahan reversal does not alter the reality that this is a
case in which the military appeared as a litigant and lost, despite being
accustomed to deferential treatment by the Court. 11 2 In the long run,
the reversal of O'Callahan may mean that the case is insignificant juris-
prudentially, but this does not make the military's instant defeat in
that case any less probative for the purposes of examining their suc-
cess as litigants. Disregarding O'Callahan as an indicator of misleading
military litigation failures is also unnecessary because O'Callahan did
not lead to any subsequent Supreme Court defeats on the grounds
that the military tried to court-martial service personnel who commit-
ted offenses that were not service-related. Indeed, in Relford v. Com-
mandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks,°3 the Court declared that the
O'Callahan rule did not apply when the non-service-related offense was
committed on a military base and allowed a court-martial to go
forward.
96. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
97. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
98. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
99. 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
100. 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
101. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 343-44.
102. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
103. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
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Overwhelming the military's rebuffed attempts to court-martial
civilian employees, dependents of service personnel, and discharged
service personnel is a long variegated history of successful appear-
ances in court-martial cases. The Supreme Court has turned aside a
right-to-counsel claim in a summary court-martial (a proceeding cov-
ering minor infractions),1°4 sharply limited civilian review of courts-
martial, 10 5 permitted the military to bar the presentation of poten-
tially exculpatory polygraph evidence in courts-martial, °6 and even
authorized the military to conduct a court-martial without engaging in
a pre-hearing investigation.' 7 In this particular cluster of cases, then,
the Supreme Court's tradition of deference is at its most vibrant.
4. The Tort Liability Cases.-The Supreme Court has ruled in
eleven lawsuits in which the military was sued in tort for damages re-
sulting from the negligence of military personnel, employees, or con-
tractors.' 08 The military has come out with a win eight times for a
success rate of 72.8%.109
The fact patterns and the reasoning used in these cases are even
more evocative of the Supreme Court's deferential instinct than the
raw win-loss data. Not only does the Supreme Court habitually shield
the military from financial liability, it at times grants the military other
extraordinary powers.
In one of the most notorious cases in the entire history of the
Supreme Court's military jurisprudence, the Court in United States v.
Reynolds11° unhesitatingly accepted the military's claim of national se-
curity interests as the explanation for refusing to turn over accident
reports about a fatal crash of a B-29 bomber, thus depriving the fami-
lies of the deceased servicemen of not only financial recovery (the
government's default in the suit was overturned), but also of even the
basic information about what happened to their loved ones. The
opinion, written by Chief Justice Fred Vinson, is a monument to the
Court's contentedness to swallow whatever line the military serves up
104. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
105. McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21 (1975).
106. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
107. Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949).
108. Omitted from this cluster is one tort liability case that the military lost, because the
point of examining this cluster is to see how successful the military has been at obtaining
Supreme Court protection from liability as a defendant, and in the omitted case-United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947)-the military was in fact the plaintiff seeking
recovery (of money it had to pay to treat one of its servicemen who was injured by one of
the company's trucks).
109. See infta app. B.
110. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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without engaging in the critical substantive evaluation that it deploys
with other litigants:
Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdi-
cated to the caprice of executive officers. Yet we will not go
so far as to say that the court may automatically require a
complete disclosure to the judge before the claim of privi-
lege will be accepted in any case. It may be possible to satisfy
the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is
a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will ex-
pose military matters which, in the interest of national secur-
ity, should not be divulged. When this is the case, the
occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court
should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is
meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the
evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.
In the instant case we cannot escape judicial notice that
this is a time of vigorous preparation for national defense.
Experience in the past war has made it common knowledge
that air power is one of the most potent weapons in our
scheme of defense, and that newly developing electronic de-
vices have greatly enhanced the effective use of air power. It
is equally apparent that these electronic devices must be kept
secret if their full military advantage is to be exploited in the
national interests. On the record before the trial court it ap-
peared that this accident occurred to a military plane which
had gone aloft to test secret electronic equipment. Certainly
there was a reasonable danger that the accident investigation
report would contain references to the secret electronic
equipment which was the primary concern of the mission.111
In this particular case, some critical evaluation of the claim of privi-
lege would have revealed the depth of the military's deception. The
Air Force had claimed that there was a substantial risk of the revela-
tion of state or military secrets related to experiments being con-
ducted on the plane and that these experiments had caused the crash
(even intimating that the bomber might have been brought down by
an act of sabotage).112 Some fifty years later, Internet-aided pursuit by
the dead crewmen's families of crash survivors revealed that no confi-
dential research was being done; the likely cause of the crash was a
111. Id. at 9-10.
112. Barry Siegel, The Secret of the B-29, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at Al.
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combination of pilot error and the appalling maintenance of the
plane.11
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,114 a narrowly divided Court
reaffirmed the general principle of giving the military latitude to con-
duct its affairs by immunizing a governmental contractor from a civil
suit stemming from an alleged design defect in the exit hatch of a
military helicopter (the craft had crashed into water during a training
exercise; the pilot, who had survived the impact, was unable to escape
and drowned). Justice Antonin Scalia couched his 5-4 opinion in the
familiar language of deference:
We think that the selection of the appropriate design for mil-
itary equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly
a discretionary function .... It often involves not merely
engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of
many technical, military, and even social considerations, in-
cluding specifically the trade-off between greater safety and
greater combat effectiveness. And we are further of the view
that permitting "second-guessing" of these judgments
through state tort suits against contractors would produce
the same effect sought to be avoided by the [statutory] ex-
emption. The financial burden of judgments against the
contractors would ultimately be passed through, substantially
if not totally, to the United States itself, since defense con-
tractors will predictably raise their prices to cover, or to in-
sure against, contingent liability for the Government-ordered
designs. To put the point differently: It makes little sense to
insulate the Government against financial liability for the
judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is
necessary when the Government produces the equipment it-
self, but not when it contracts for the production.' 1 5
In addition to providing additional evidence that the Supreme
Court is preternaturally deferential to military claims, these cases also
show the consequences of this posture. United States v. Reynolds, for
example, is the constitutional predicate for the encroachments on
civil liberties in the name of guaranteeing security that were passed in
113. Id. The crewmen's families eventually sought a writ of error coram nobis from the
Supreme Court, not to overturn the Reynolds case but simply to recover the lost money
judgment. Id The Court denied the request. Id.
114. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
115. Id. at 511-12 (internal citation omitted).
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the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, including the USA Patriot
Act.' 16
There is one other recurring fact pattern that is worth highlight-
ing alongside these four large clusters of cases:
5. The Japanese Relocation Cases: Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and
Endo.-The World War IIJapanese internment cases are probably the
most glaring and notorious examples of the Court's willingness to
kowtow before military judgment. When American citizens of Japa-
nese ancestry challenged the imposition of curfews and forced reloca-
tion into camps,' 17 the Supreme Court-which had a few years earlier
announced an increased skepticism for "statutes directed at ... dis-
crete and insular minorities""1 -- sacrificed its newfound skittishness
about laws that attacked entire ethnic groups upon the altar of per-
ceived military necessity. In Hirabayashi v. United States, 19 the Court
turned aside the complaint of a Japanese-American college student
who refused to submit to the curfew; in Korematsu v. United States,'2 °
the Court similarly rejected the appeal of a Japanese-American de-
fense worker who defied a relocation order.
The key to the Court's approval of the curfew and relocation or-
ders is their finding in both that the military deemed these policies
necessary. The language of the two cases reveals just how much lati-
tude the Court was prepared to extend to the military, essentially es-
tablishing the low threshold that these policy decisions need only
avoid being completely unsustainable. 1 ' In Hirabayashi, they subordi-
nated their qualms about the sweeping nature of the orders to their
belief that the military has to be allowed to do its job in times of na-
tional crisis:
116. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18,
22, 31, 42, 49 & 50 U.S.C.).
117. The curfew and relocation orders were imposed by General John DeWitt, who was
in charge of the defense of the West Coast (the Tom Ridge of his day?). DeWitt was acting
pursuant to authority granted by President Roosevelt, who had issued two executive orders
in early 1942 designed to enable the rounding-up and confining of allJapanese Americans,
in the belief that some of them might pose a threat of subversion. Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 85-86 (1943).
118. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
119. 320 U.S. at 81.
120. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
121. It is at this point that O'Connor's suggestion that the Supreme Court took until the
mid-1950s to shift from a "noninterference" approach to one which was explicitly deferen-
tial can be questioned. See O'Connor, supra note 8, at 164. The Court's opinions in Hira-
bayashi and Korematsu are not passive justifications for staying out of the military's way; they
are belligerently deferential endorsements of the military's expertise.
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Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty to this
country of the citizens of Japanese ancestry, we cannot reject
as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of
Congress that there were disloyal members of that popula-
tion, whose number and strength could not be precisely and
quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making
branches of the Government did not have ground for believ-
ing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace
to the national defense and safety, which demanded that
prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against
it.122
The following year, Justice Black built on Hirabayashi in Korematsu and
maintained that the military's refusal to separate out loyal Japanese
Americans from the relocation process was entirely justified:
It was because we could not reject the finding of the military
authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immedi-
ate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal that we sus-
tained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the
whole group. In the instant case, temporary exclusion of the
entire group was rested by the military on the same ground.
The judgment that exclusion of the whole group was for the
same reason a military imperative answers the contention
that the exclusion was in the nature of group punishment
based on antagonism to those of Japanese origin.
123
The fact that it was the military nature of these decisions that
swayed the Court was readily apparent in Ex parte Endo,1 24 in which an
American citizen of Japanese ancestry who had declared her loyalty to
the United States was nevertheless subject to confinement to a reloca-
tion camp in Utah. In ordering her release, the Court through Justice
Douglas noted that the decision to continue the confinement of Mit-
suye Endo was made under civilian, and not military, auspices:
It should be noted at the outset that we do not have here a
question such as was presented in Ex parte Milligan, or in Ex
parte Quirin, where the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try
persons according to the law of war was challenged in habeas
corpus proceedings. Mitsuye Endo is detained by a civilian
agency, the War Relocation Authority, not by the military.
Moreover, the evacuation program was not left exclusively to
the military; the Authority was given a large measure of re-
122. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99.
123. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
124. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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sponsibility for its execution and Congress made its enforce-
ment subject to civil penalties by the Act of March 21, 1942.
Accordingly, no questions of military law are involved. 125
The crucial distinguishing fact was that unlike the faceless mob sub-
ject to the orders in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, Mitsuye Endo had
been specifically asked to declare her loyalty in the process of ob-
taining a permit to leave the camp.' 26 Once she had affirmed her
loyalty, there was no longer any military justification to hold her; the
fig leaf that was the military's plea that sifting the loyal from the dis-
loyal was too burdensome a task simply fell away. 1
27
III. ANALYSIS
The Framers of the Constitution had a well-documented sense of
mistrust of standing armies, and many of the choices they made in
setting up the Republic were made with at least one eye on keeping
the military on a leash. Whether it was George Washington laying
down his sword and retiring after the Battle of Yorktown rather than
assuming automatic leadership of the new nation, the creation of the
Third Amendment banning quartering of soldiers, or the very notion
of congressional oversight over the Armed Forces, events were man-
aged and procedures were drafted in the spirit of erecting bulwarks
against domestic military encroachment power. Of course, at the
same time the Framers were establishing a Supreme Court with hazily
defined powers, so it is not entirely surprising that the Court has
proven to be an insufficient check on military power. This is not to
say that the Framers anticipated that the Court would be complicit in
military aggrandizement, but what the foregoing cases have shown is
that this is exactly what has occurred. It is simply not enough to sug-
gest that the Supreme Court prefers to merely avoid interfering in the
military's business. The very act of noninterference creates knowl-
edge among the military that civilian capability to restrain their deci-
125. Id. at 297-98 (internal citations omitted).
126. Id. at 292 n.10.
127. Endo was a unanimous decision, which means that the authors of Hirabayashi (Jus-
tice Stone) and Korematsu (justice Black) signed on to Justice Douglas's opinion. Howard
Ball and Phillip J. Cooper's joint biography of Justices Black and Douglas, which takes
notice of "the Court's deferential posture during time of war," sheds light onto Justice
Black's thinking in Endo. "Clearly, for Black, the issue raised by Endo was not that of the
earlier Japanese exclusion cases, the constitutionality of the congressional war powers.
Endo's case, coming toward the end of the war, involved a series of procedural questions
rather than the central issue of military powers in wartime." HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J.
COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: Huco BLACK, WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AND AMERICA'S CONSTI-
TUTIONAL REVOLUTION 116 (1992).
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sions will be limited. Furthermore, the Court's work has traveled well
beyond mere noninterference or even deference; at times, the Court
has been an enabler of military misconduct.
28
Specific investigation of the military's success rate when it ap-
pears before (or is hauled before) the Supreme Court shows that the
deferential tradition is multifaceted. We can observe, for example,
that the military's Supreme Court defeats tend to be concentrated in
wartime, when the military tends the most towards overreaching. Out
of the sixty-three Supreme Court defeats the military has endured
since 1918, fifteen of them were concentrated between 1968 and
1972, when the Vietnam War had devolved into a quagmire. But this
may be a question better analyzed in terms of quality, not quantity.
While the military may have lost a lot of wartime court battles, the fact
still remains that they win the battles that posed the most potential for
abrogating liberty, such as Korematsu and O'Brien.
As for the question of why the military loses cases (or, put another
way, does the military do anything in particular that reduces its odds
of Supreme Court success?), the research here seems to support a
seemingly counterintuitive notion: we can interpret the military's
comparatively spotty record of success in the exemption cases the
same way we can interpret their overwhelming success in the court-
martial cases. What both clusters of cases show is that the military
stands the most risk of Supreme Court defeat when the question at
bar can be boiled down to the following core: Does the military have
authority over this person?
The conscientious objector cases, in which the military is compar-
atively unsuccessful, are about who the military can take in. They are
not about how such people are to be treated once they are part of the
Armed Forces. Similarly, most (but not all) of the military's defeats in
the court-martial cases come when the military is attempting to court-
martial someone over whom they have no real authority, such as ser-
vicemen's wives who commit crimes during peacetime. There is a
common link between the attempted court-martial of a soldier's wife
accused of murdering one of the couple's children 2 9 and the mili-
tary's unsuccessful attempt to prosecute a conscientious objector
128. Michal Belknap has argued that the use of military commissions to try crimes com-
mitted on American soil is invariably "rife with procedural irregularities and substantive
injustice." Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military Tribunals
in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REv. 433, 441 (2002); see also supra Parts I.B, II.C.4
(discussing Goldman v. Weinberger and United States v. Reynolds).
129. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
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claimant who refused to take the oath of induction. 3 ' What these
cases show is the one dimension of the Supreme Court's relationship
with the military in which their workaday deference drops away: the
Supreme Court's tradition of deference to the military does not ex-
tend-and, logically, should not extend-to cases encompassing non-
military persons. Instead, in these cases we see the Supreme Court
taking an active role in reaffirming the constitutional guarantees of
everyday citizens; to a certain extent, then, these cases really are not
about the military at all.'
3
'
While the military's choices about who they wish to control are
subject to Court scrutiny, the military's policy choices about how they
will treat people over whom they validly exercise authority are rarely
subjected to rigorous review, and it is here that the Court's tradition
of deference is at its apex. Simply stated, the military as a profession
gets much greater latitude to manage its own affairs than other profes-
sions. When military policy decisions are on a collision course with
constitutional guarantees, such as in Goldman v. Weinberger, the mili-
tary gets a pass. Similarly, the military's decisions about how to treat
persons who are unquestionably within the reach of military authority
also go mostly unchallenged.
132
But when policy decisions in other professions brush up against
the Constitution, those decisions stand a much greater chance of be-
ing invalidated. In fact, when professional expertise stemming from
nonmilitary sources has been submitted, the Supreme Court has ex-
hibited a remarkable unwillingness to concede that those who know
better actually know better. One glaring example is Edenfield v.
Fane, 3  in which the accounting profession's rules banning its mem-
bers from engaging in face-to-face uninvited solicitation of business
were thrown out by the Court as violative of the free speech rights of
accountants who wished to solicit business in that fashion. In a
marked contrast to its refusal to require the military to present evi-
dence justifying its claim to state secrets privilege, the Court de-
130. Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 (1944).
131. This pattern of protecting the rights of nonmilitary persons is revealed in other
settings. In United States v. Causby, the military's use of an airfield outside Greensboro,
North Carolina, had the effect of destroying a local chicken farm (which could no longer
operate because of the lights and noise coming from bombers taking off and landing).
328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946). The Supreme Court held that this was a taking of private prop-
erty requiring just compensation to the beleaguered owners of the chicken farm. Id. at
261.
132. See, e.g., Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) (allowing the military to withhold
an officer's earned commission because he refused to take an oath that he had never been
a communist).
133. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
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manded evidentiary proof of the wisdom of the accounting
profession's judgment:
The Board has not demonstrated that, as applied in the busi-
ness context, the ban on CPA solicitation advances its as-
serted interests in any direct and material way. It presents no
studies that suggest personal solicitation of prospective busi-
ness clients by CPA's [sic] creates the dangers of fraud, over-
reaching, or compromised independence that the Board
claims to fear.1
34
Edenfield, however, is not the only example of the Supreme Court's
selective professional deference. A more recent commercial speech
case also illustrates this phenomenon. In Thompson v. Western States
Medical Center,'35 the Court invalidated a restriction on pharmacists
advertising their drug "compounding" services. "Compounding" re-
fers to the time-honored practice of customizing prescriptions to meet
the needs of individual customers who, for varying reasons (often al-
lergy-related), may be unable to take a certain medicine; the com-
pounding pharmacist can add or subtract ingredients from a given
drug, for example." 6 One potential downside to compounding is
that the new compounded drug has not been subjected to rigorous
safety testing by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).137 In al-
lowing the practice of compounding to continue, but attempting to
limit its reach, the FDA had essentially relied on its professional judg-
ment to draw a utilitarian line. The FDA felt that the best approach to
compounding was to craft a compromise that would allow individual
patients with acute needs for custom-tailored medicines to receive
their necessary treatments, while at the same time warding off the pos-
sibility that unnecessary and potentially unsafe compounds could be
produced by pharmacists trying to generate demand for customized
drugs or produced for customers who decide that they simply must
have a more personalized prescription experience and who pressure
pharmacists to satisfy this urge.' 38
However, the FDA's considered expertise about the responsibili-
ties and imperatives of the pharmacy profession was cavalierly dis-
missed by the Supreme Court, which offered up a series of alternative
solutions to the dilemma, many of which were more burdensome on
the practice of pharmacy than a mere advertising ban. Among the
134. Id. at 771.
135. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
136. Id. at 360-61.
137. Id. at 362-63.
138. Id. at 369-70.
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ideas deemed better by the Court were an outright ban on the use of
certain equipment for compounding purposes, a cap on the number
of compounded prescriptions (regardless of need) a pharmacist could
dispense, and a cap on out-of-state compounding transactions." 9 The
Court's invocation of the principle that "regulating speech must be a
last-not first-resort,"14 ° while well-intentioned and admirably
speech-protective, was a facile response to a complicated problem.
There was nothing redeeming, however, in the hubris of five law-
yers"' with a complete lack of pharmaceutical experience disposi-
tively substituting their dilettantish notions of good responses to a
public health problem in place of the solution promulgated by ex-
haustively trained industry experts. 142
139. Id. at 372.
140. Id. at 373.
141. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote Western States Medical Center, joined by justices
Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, David Souter, and Clarence Thomas; Justice Stephen
Breyer authored a ripping dissent, joined by ChiefJustice William Rehnquist and Justices
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens. It is not surprising that the Court's practical
solutions would be put forth by Justice O'Connor, long-renowned (for better or worse) for
opinions that eschewed broad interpretive pronouncements in favor of pragmatic ap-
proaches. Nor is it surprising that her invalidation of an advertising ban would be sup-
ported by Justice Clarence Thomas, who has emerged in the last decade as the Court's
most orthodox advocate for extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech
identical to the protection afforded to noncommercial speech.
142. There is one profession that, at least for a time, received Supreme Court indul-
gence on par with what was extended to the military: the legal profession. For years, even
as the Court was expanding the constitutional protections afforded to commercial speech,
the Court refused to throw out bar associations' rules against advertising and business solic-
itation by lawyers. In Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., the Court let stand a rule prohibiting
attorneys from mailing out targeted direct mail solicitations to accident victims within
thirty days of the accident. 515 U.S. 618 (1995). A decade earlier, in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the Court reaffirmed the Ohio Bar's prerog-
ative to punish lawyers who overreach in their advertising (even as they invalidated the
particular sanction in that case). 471 U.S. 626 (1985). In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, the
Court upheld a sanction for an overaggressive and pressurized in-person solicitation of an
accident victim by an ambulance chaser. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
The fact that lawyering is the only profession that receives a degree of deference that
even approaches that which is extended to the military does not, of course, dilute the
significance of the Supreme Court's pro-military posture. Plainly, the members of the Su-
preme Court, sitting atop the legal profession, have a personal stake in the outcome; the
nine most important lawyers in the country have a natural policy preference to preserve
bar associations' ability to police the field and punish renegade lawyers who besmirch the
noble calling. The opinion of the court in Ohralik, in fact, was written by a former presi-
dent of the American Bar Association, Justice Lewis Powell. Other members of the nine-
lawyer elite have openly expressed their disdain for the huckstering tactics of their
downmarket colleagues; ChiefJustice Warren Burger, for example, repeatedly referred to
attorney advertising as "sheer shysterism." Linda Greenhouse, Friends for Decades, but Years
on Court Left Them Strangers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2004, at Al.
Recently, however, this willingness to give lawyering the benefit of the professional
doubt-a benefit not extended to other industries outside of the armed forces-has been
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Institutions of higher education are yet another type of litigant
which receives only selective deference from the Supreme Court. At
times, the Court is willing to bow to colleges and universities' educa-
tional mission, as expressed in the concept of academic freedom. On
the one hand, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court went out of its way to
subordinate its own judgment to that of the University of Michigan
(which argued that securing a diverse student body was so compelling
a state interest that it satisfied strict scrutiny) and did so explicitly:
"The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essen-
tial to its educational mission is one to which we defer."' 43 This lan-
guage on academic freedom matched the spirit of Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke- "The freedom of a university to make
its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student
body."' 44 Similarly, in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin v.
Southworth, the Court celebrated the special functions of institutions of
higher learning and intimated that a university's decisions made in
furtherance of the school's educational mission would be accorded
significant weight:
The University may determine that its mission is well-served
if students have the means to engage in dynamic discussions
of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political sub-
jects in the extracurricular campus life outside the lecture
hall. If the University reaches this conclusion, it is entitled to
impose a mandatory fee to sustain an open dialogue to these
ends. 145
On the other hand, the Court was not so indulgent in Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia.'46 Even as they celebrated
the mission of higher education conceptually, 147 in practice they gave
received coolly even within the Court itself. As Justice Kennedy archly noted in his Went for
It, Inc. dissent, "[i]t is telling that the essential thrust of all the material adduced to justify
the State's interest is devoted to the reputational concerns of the bar." 513 U.S. at 641.
143. 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). For a detailed examination of the Court's decision to
defer to admissions officials in Grutter, see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, In
Defense of Deference, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 133 (2004) (arguing that the case was as much a
matter of deference to policymakers as it was a matter of constitutional interpretation).
144. 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
145. 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000).
146. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
147. Most notably, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion observed:
In ancient Athens, and, as Europe entered into a new period of intellectual awak-
ening, in places like Bologna, Oxford, and Paris, universities began as voluntary
and spontaneous assemblages or concourses for students to speak and to write
and to learn. The quality and creative power of student intellectual life to this day
remains a vital measure of a school's influence and attainment. For the Univer-
sity, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks
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the University the back of its hand. The University had denied an
evangelical Christian magazine a place on the school's Student Activi-
ties Fund because the magazine would be advancing a religious mes-
sage.' 48 The Court's decision in Rosenberger to force the University to
fund the magazine ran directly counter to its past (and future) insis-
tence that institutions of higher learning get to make the call on their
educational mission unencumbered by judicial meddling. Rosenberger
can be in part explained by the fact that the University's decision not
to fund the magazine was both an institutional matter (academic free-
dom) and a constitutional matter. The University had determined
that to fund the magazine would violate the Establishment Clause, but
the Court had been reorienting its establishment jurisprudence
around the concept of state "neutrality" (as opposed to outright
noninvolvement) and informed the University that its interpretation
of the Clause-the very fulcrum upon which the school's decision-
making was balanced-was misguided, at least as far as the Court saw
it.' 49 Whatever the Court's core motivations, Rosenberger ties to South-
worth and other higher education cases as examples of the Court's
selectively deferential approach to nonmilitary litigants.
To a certain extent, the military's success rate as a repeat litigant
is consistent with the success of other repeat litigants. The seminal
work of Marc Galanter on this subject 5 ° has been ably augmented by
the findings of scholars such as Reginald S. Sheehan, William Mishler,
and Donald R. Songer, who determined that resource advantages for
certain categories of repeat litigants were to an extent subordinated to
the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court at a given time, even
when the parties were as divergent as the federal government squar-
ing off against a poor litigant.15
1
the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for
the Nation's intellectual life, its college and university campuses.
Id. at 836 (internal citation omitted).
148. Id. at 822-23. The magazine was entitled Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the
University of Virginia, and its stated mission was "to challenge Christians to live, in word and
deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a
personal relationship with Jesus Christ means." Id. at 826.
149. Id. at 845-46. And of course, the University of Michigan only enjoyed Supreme
Court deference in one of the two challenges to its race-conscious admissions policies; no
such deference was forthcoming in Gratz.
150. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
151. Reginald S. Sheehan, William Mishler & Donald R. Songer, Ideology, Status, and the
Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 464 (1992).
Kevin T. McGuire has pushed this argument further by suggesting that it is not merely
confined to the litigants, arguing that lawyers with experience arguing before the Supreme
Court are much more likely to win cases in which they were opposed by lawyers with less
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What differentiates the military's repeat-player success from the
success of other repeat litigants is that the military's success at the
Supreme Court level is not a mere function of resources. The Su-
preme Court's reflexively deferential posture may in some way be in-
formed by the military's status as a repeat player, as well as the status
of many of the military's opposing litigants as one-shotters (and
acutely undermanned one-shotters, to boot). But the military's suc-
cess rate is an instance in which there is an "ideology" backstopping
the success of this particular repeat player. The Supreme Court's pro-
military decisions are not a happy accident of structural litigational
characteristics; instead, they are the affirmative product of an intellec-
tual perspective that the Court unabashedly promotes. The military
often gets the benefit of the doubt from the Supreme Court not as a
byproduct of advantages in resources and experience; rather, the mili-
tary often gets the benefit of the doubt from the Supreme Court pre-
cisely because the Supreme Court wants to give them the benefit of
the doubt. t52
This project also demonstrates that conventional scholarly wis-
dom about the contours of the military deference tradition is hit-or-
miss. Diane Mazur has argued that the Court's deference habit is a
recent development: "[T]his deference departs from constitutional
text and from a line of Supreme Court precedent concerning civilian-
military relations extending back before the Civil War. Broad judicial
deference to military discretion is only a creation of the post-Vietnam,
all-volunteer military .... -15' This assertion runs counter to the data
presented here, which shows that the deference tradition has distant
roots and that if anything, the Court was much more deferential to
the military before the Vietnam War. However, Mazur has also argued
that the Court's deferential posture is "only a creation of one single
Justice of the Supreme Court, William H. Rehnquist. "154 Here, she
appears to be on solid ground. Although a comprehensive analysis of
the voting patterns of individual Justices in military cases has not been
Supreme Court experience. Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role
ofExperienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57J. POL. 187 (1995). At the same time, however,
McGuire has also determined that the success rate of the solicitor general is no different
from that of other experienced Supreme Court advocates; that office's institutional pres-
tige seems to have no impact on Supreme Court outcomes in and of itself. Kevin T. Mc-
Guire, Explaining Executive Success in the US. Supreme Court, 51 POL. REs. Q. 505 (1998).
152. A conclusion that would likely be seconded by Sheehan, Mishler, and Songer. See
supra note 151.
153. Diane H. Mazur, Rehnquist's Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth Advance




presented here, it is worth pointing out that the military's success rate
of 84.2% (sixteen wins, three losses) during the Rehnquist Court is
higher than its rate under the preceding six Chief Justices.155
IV. THE GUANTANAMO/ENEMY COMBATANT DECISIONS OF 2004
The three most recent entries in the list of military cases-Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld,15 6 Rumsfeld v. Padilla,'57 and Rasul v. Bush1 58-at first
glance appear to fly squarely in the face of the Supreme Court's defer-
ential tradition. The challenges to military procedures were upheld in
Hamdi, in which the Court rejected the government's claim to be able
to hold enemy combatants indefinitely without affording them the op-
portunity to challenge their confinement,159 and in Rasul, in which
the Court declared that civilian courts did indeed have jurisdiction to
hear challenges to the detention of enemy combatants at Guanta-
namo. 6 ' The military's lone "win" in these cases is an especially tenu-
ous one. Although the Court in Padilla rejected the accused's
contention that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was the appro-
priate legal custodian to be sued (thus compelling Padilla to refile the
lawsuit), the Court pointedly refused to rule on the important ques-
tion of whether the detention of Padilla was lawful.1 61
However, the Rasul case may in fact fit the deferential model in
one important aspect. Rasul was the only one of the three enemy
combatant cases that saw military personnel submit amicus briefs.
Three such briefs were submitted: one by retired military officers only
and the other two by combinations of retired military officers, former
attorneys general, and other governmental figures.1 62 The exclusively
military amicus brief is the one that is the most fascinating because it
was submitted in support of Rasul and in opposition to the military
policy that Rasul was challenging.
155. Then again, as an Associate justice, Rehnquist did join Justice Byron White's opin-
ion in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo and voted to allow equitable relief against the Navy as a
consequence of its training exercises is Vieques, Puerto Rico. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
156. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
157. 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
158. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
159. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537.
160. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
161. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430. On September 9, 2005, the Fourth Circuit upheld the
indefinite holding of Padilla as an enemy combatant. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th
Cir. 2005).
162. There was still yet other notable amicus in Rasul Fred Korematsu also submitted a
brief supporting Rasul's arguments for access to the legal process. Brief of Amicus Curiae
Fred Korematsu in Support of Petitioners, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343, 03-
6696).
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Specifically, the brief contained a section headed Failure to Provide
Any Judicial Review of the Government's Actions Could Have Grave Conse-
quences for U.S. Military Forces Captured in Future Conflicts.16 Beneath
this heading, the military officers noted that "even as American offi-
cials condemn other nations for detaining people indefinitely without
access to a court or tribunal, authoritarian regimes elsewhere are
pointing to U.S. treatment of the Guantanamo prisoners as justifica-
tion for such actions." '64 They followed up with a dire warning that
was squarely rooted in military expertise:
If American detention of the Guantanamo prisoners-indef-
inite confinement without any type of review by a court or
tribunal-is regarded as precedent for similar actions by
countries with which we are at peace, it is obvious that it may
be similarly regarded by enemies who capture American
soldiers in an existing or future conflict. As a result, the lives
of captured American military forces may well be endan-
gered by the United States' failure to grant foreign prisoners
in its custody the same rights that the United States insists be
accorded to American prisoners held by foreigners.' 65
Notwithstanding the fact that the retired military officers had joined
what proved to be the winning side, their admonitions were not a ma-
jor factor in the opinion. Justice Stevens's majority opinion did not
touch on these issues at all, and Justice Kennedy's concurrence made
only an oblique reference to the military dimensions of the deten-
tions.16 6 The brief itself was neither quoted nor even mentioned in
the opinion.167
Consequently, there is a definite limit to the similarity between
the Retired Military Officers brief in Rasul and the Becton brief
168
163. Brief Amicus Curiae of Retired Military Officers in Support of Petitioners at 11,
Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
164. Id. at 14.
165. Id. at 14-15.
166. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466. Justice Kennedy wrote:
Indefinite detention without trial or other proceeding presents altogether differ-
ent considerations. It allows friends and foes alike to remain in detention. It
suggests a weaker case of military necessity and much greater alignment with the
traditional function of habeas corpus. Perhaps, where detainees are taken from a
zone of hostilities, detention without proceedings or trial would be justified by
military necessity for a matter of weeks; but as the period of detention stretches
from months to years, the case for continued detention to meet military exigen-
cies becomes weaker.
Id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167. In fact, none of the thirty-one amicus briefs were even referenced.
168. Brief of Lt. Gen.Julius W. Becton et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
supra note 4.
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which featured so prominently in Grutter v. Bollinger. Nevertheless, it
is fair to pose the question of whether the Rasul brief may well re-
present a subtle continuation of the military deference tradition. As
we have seen, this tradition is at its most potent when the Supreme
Court is presented with questions of military policy; the Court hardly
ever countermands the military's judgment in such cases. While at
first glance the Court's critique of the Guantanamo detentions seems
to be a departure from that trend, the military brief in Rasul under-
scores an important distinction-the Guantanamo detentions may be
less a matter of military policy than one of civilian political policy.'69
The brief makes it very clear that from a purely military standpoint,
the Guantanamo detentions are a bad policy choice.' 7 ° In so noting,
it calls attention to the fact that the key decisions implementing these
detentions were made by civilian politicians ensconced in Washing-
ton.171 Although the Court did not latch onto this distinction in its
opinion, it will be intriguing to see how the Court deals with the re-
sumption of the Padilla lawsuit, as well as other inevitable challenges
to the accoutrements to the war on terror.'
72
169. Brief Amicus Curiae of Retired Military Officers, supra note 163.
170. Id. at 1.
171. Id. at 8-11.
172. Kim Lane Scheppele has recently argued that the immediate response to the Sep-
tember 11 attacks was less threatening to civil liberties than what followed it.
[T]he Bush administration's response to 9/11 in both domestic and foreign pol-
icy is not what one would typically expect of a true emergency; namely, quick
responses that violate the constitutional order followed by a progressive normali-
zation. Instead, the American government (including all three branches working
together) responded with much constitutional care right after 9/11, fully aware
that the temptation would be to overreact. The greater abuses have come as 9/11
recedes and executive policy has turned toward larger and larger constitutional
exceptions, with the active acquiescence so far of both Congress and the courts.
The reaction to 9/11 was not the declaration of a sudden emergency that has
gradually abated, but instead has involved a measured immediate response fol-
lowed by ever-expanding justifications for the assertion of executive and unilat-
eral power.
Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/
11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1003 (2004).
It may be that the Court's skepticism about military power is finally catching up to the
skepticism that has developed among the public in the post-Vietnam era. Jack Goldsmith
and Cass Sunstein have noted that the public's general sense of unconditional approval of
Franklin Roosevelt's decision to have Nazi saboteurs tried by military tribunal (in what
eventually became Ex parte Quirin) stands in contrast to a much more ambivalent endorse-
ment of George W. Bush's order to enable the 9/11 terrorists to be subjected to similar
procedures: "The legal and social world of 2001 is radically different from the legal and
social world of 1942. In this new world, it was much more natural to think that the dis-
placement of civilian courts in favor of a more expeditious military procedure would of-
fend constitutional values." Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal
Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONS-T. COMMENT. 261, 284 (2002).
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CONCLUSION: AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
As indicated at the outset, this Article represents the first step on
the road to a larger endeavor. The findings that have been summa-
rized will later be complemented by a number of additional inquiries,
which will not be limited to exploring the military's Supreme Court
voting record pre-1918. A full accounting of the dynamics of the Su-
preme Court's tradition of deference must also examine the voting
records of individual Justices. Later research will not only compile
this information, but it will also place Justices' military case voting re-
cord within a biographical context, paying close attention to the mili-
tary case voting records of the thirty-five men (out of 110 individuals)
to have sat on the Supreme Court while having previously served in
the military.1 7 It is also necessary to examine in detail the precise
scenario with which this Article began and ended-the military's suc-
cess rate as amicus curiae. 17 4 There is obviously much that can still be
learned about the Supreme Court's habit of deferring to military judg-
ment; this Article has hopefully begun to reveal the dynamics of this
tradition.
173. Three members of the most recent Supreme Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Stevens and Kennedy-served in the Armed Forces, though only Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Stevens saw active duty, both in World War II. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL.,
THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 240-41 (1994). Other than Justice Kennedy's 1961 stint
in the California Army National Guard, nobody who has served in the Armed Forces after
1946 has gone on to the Supreme Court. Id.
Justice Samuel Alito, President Bush's appointee to the seat vacated by Justice
O'Connor, was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Army upon his graduation
from Princeton in 1972 (one of only twelve members of Princeton's R.O.T.C. program,
which was being phased out). Neil A. Lewis & Scott Shane, The Methodical jurist, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2005, at Al. After law school, he went on active duty for three months. Id.
174. There is already excellent work on how the repeat-player literature translates to the
amicus process, with scholars analyzing whether the success of repeat players can be offset
by multiple amicus brief filings on the other side. See Donald R. Songer & Reginald S.
Sheehan, Interest Group Success in the Courts: Amicus Participation in the Supreme Court, 46 PoL.
RES. Q. 339 (1993) (finding no evidence that increased amici support increased the
chances of Supreme Court success). For the purposes of the expansion of this project, a
specific compilation of whether having the military as an amicus increases a litigant's
chance of success is something that must be measured.
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APPENDIX A: MILITARY CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT
1918-2004
CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
Rumsfeld v. Is the Secretary of Defense the legal No-must refile WIN
Padilla, 542 U.S. custodian of a designated "enemy suit
426 (2004) combatant"?
Hamdi v. Can the government indefinitely hold No LOSS
Rumsfeld, 542 a designated "enemy combatant"
U.S. 507 (2004) without providing an opportunity to
challenge?
Rasul v. Bush, Do civilian courts have jurisdiction to Yes LOSS
542 U.S. 466 hear challenges to the detention of
(2004) suspected terrorists at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba?
Clinton v. Can a civilian court enjoin the Air No WIN
Goldsmith, 526 Force from dropping an HIV-positive
U.S. 529 (1999) officer from its rolls?
Dep't of the Is government immune from a third- Yes WIN
Army v. Blue party lien on funds held by the Army
Fox, Inc., 525 for a construction project?
U.S. 255 (1999)
Rumsfeld v. Does a military rule barring use of No-rule upheld WIN
Padilla, 542 U.S. polygraph evidence in courts-martial
426 (2004) interfere with defendant's fair trial
rights ?
Edmond v. Does the Appointments Clause bar the No WIN
United States, Secretary of Transportation from
520 U.S. 651 appointing civilian judges to the
(1997) Coast Guard Court?
Loving v. United Can the president, as commander in Yes-no WIN
States, 517 U.S. chief prescribe aggravating factors for separation of
748 (1996) death penalty in courts-martial? powers violation
Ryder v. United Does the de facto officer doctrine apply No LOSS
States, 515 U.S. to civilian judges on military courts if
177 (1995) the constitutionality of the
appointment is at issue?
Davis v. United Do Miranda rights attach to an No WIN
States, 512 U.S. ambiguous statement regarding
452 (1994) counsel at a Navy custodial
interrogation?
Key Tronic Can a company suing the Air Force No WIN
Corp. v. United for the costs of environmental-cleanup
States, 511 U.S. work recover attorney'sfees?
809 (1994)
Weiss v. United Does the Appointments Clause bar No WIN
States, 510 U.S. JAG from assigning military officers
163 (1994) to be judges at courts-martial and the
initial appeal level?
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CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
Perpich v. Dep't Must a state governor consent to No-no Militia WIN
of Defense, 496 federal training of state National Clause violation
U.S. 334 (1990) Guard troops outside the United
States?
Boyle v. United Can military contractors be immune Yes WIN
Techs. Corp., from tort suits even absent an explicit
487 U.S. 500 statutory grant of immunity?
(1988)
Dep't of the Can a civilian review board review No WIN
Navy v. Egan, the merits of a denial of security
484 U.S. 518 clearance cited as basis for firing a
(1988) federal employee?
ETSI Pipeline Does the Secretary of the Interior have No WIN
Project v. the power to sell water from an Army
Missouri, 484 reservoir without the Secretary of
U.S. 495 (1988) Army's consent?
United States v. Are tort actions available to No WIN
Stanley, 483 U.S. serviceman suing over being exposed
669 (1987) to LSD experimentation incident to
military service?
Solorio v. United Can the military initiate a court- Yes WIN
States, 483 U.S. martial even if the offenses charged
435 (1987) are not military in nature?
United States v. Can service personnel sue for damages No WIN
Johnson, 481 incurred incident to service because of
U.S. 681 (1987) the negligence of federal civilian
employees?
Goldman v. Does the Free Exercise Clause bar the No WIN
Weinberger, 475 Air Force from refusing to allow an
U.S. 503 (1986) officer to wear a yarmulke while
indoors?
United States v. Can the Army Corps of Engineers Yes WIN
Riverside enjoin a property owner from
Bayview Homes, dumping fill material into wetlands
Inc., 474 U.S. next to navigable waters?
121 (1985)
United States v. Can service personnel sue the No WIN
Shearer, 473 government for failing to protect them
U.S. 52 (1985) from being assaulted by fellow service
personnel?
United States v. Can a "bar letter" be enforced after Yes WIN
Albertini, 472 nine years as against a visitor to a
U.S. 675 (1985) military open house during a protest?
Wayte v. United Does the government's "passive No WIN
States, 470 U.S. enforcement" of draft registration laws
598 (1985) violate the First and Fifth
Amendments?
Sel. Serv. Sys. v. Can federal student aid be denied to Yes WIN







CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
United States v. Are confidential statements obtained Yes WIN
Weber Aircraft during an Air Force crash probe
Corp., 465 U.S. protected from disclosure by Exemption
792 (1984) 5 of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)?
Lockheed Does the Federal Employees' No LOSS
Aircraft Corp. v. Compensation Act bar third-party
United States, recovery against the United States for
460 U.S. 190 the crash of an Air Force jet?
(1983)
Weinberger v. Can courts grant equitable relief to Yes LOSS
Romero-Barcelo, people suing the Navy for
456 U.S. 305 environmental damages in Vieques
(1982) training exercises?
Weinberger v. Must the Navy prepare and release a No WIN
Catholic Action statement on storage of nuclear
of Haw., 454 weapons, pursuant to the National
U.S. 139 (1981) Environmental Policy Act?
Roskter v. Does requiring only males to register No WIN
Goldberg, 453 for the draft violate the Fifth
U.S. 57 (1981) Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause?
Peeples v. Is a Navy seaman ordered discharged No N/A
Brown, 444 U.S. for sexual misconduct entitled to a
1303 (1979) stay of the discharge order?
Sec'y of the Can the Navy and Marine Corps Yes WIN
Navy v. Huff, require service personnel to secure
444 U.S. 453 permission to circulate petitions?
(1980)
Brown v. Glines, Can the Air Force require service Yes WIN
444 U.S. 348 personnel to secure permission to
(1980) circulate petitions?
Stencel Aero Must the government indemnify third- No-original suit WIN
Eng'g Corp. v. party suppliers for lawsuits filed over is barred
United States, malfunctioning military aircraft?
431 U.S. 666
(1977)
Dep't of the Air Does FOIA apply to a request for Yes LOSS
Force v. Rose, redacted summaries of service
425 U.S. 352 academies' records of ethics code
(1976) violation cases?
Greer v. Spock, Can the military bar political Yes-base is not a WIN
424 U.S. 828 candidates or their supporters from public forum
(1975) portions of a military base that allow
civilian access?
Middendorf v. Does the right to counsel apply in No WIN
Henry, 425 U.S. summary courts-martial procedures to
25 (1975) deal with minor offenses?
McLucas v. Is a serviceman entitled to civilian No WIN
DeChamplain, review of an injunction against court-
421 U.S. 21 martial when the decision backing
(1975) injunction was reversed?
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CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
Schlesinger v. Is an Army officer entitled to an No WIN
Councilman, 420 injunction of his court-martial for
U.S. 738 (1975) marijuana possession since offense is
not "service-related"?
Schlesinger v. Can the military use different criteria Yes WIN
Ballard, 419 U.S. for promotion based on a candidate's
498 (1975) gender?
Sec'y of the Is a rule against service personnel No (jurisdiction WIN
Navy v. Avrech, publishing disloyal statement issue ducked)
418 U.S. 676 adversely affecting troops
(1974) unconstitutionally vague?
Schlesinger v. Does the status of several members of No WIN
Reservists Congress as Army reservists give rise
Comm. to Stop to the taxpayer standing of a protest
the War, 418 group?
U.S. 208 (1974)
Parker v. Levy, Are military disciplinary regulations No WIN
417 U.S. 733 vague or overbroad, thus preventing
(1974) court-martial of disobedient personnel?
Davis v. United Can a prisoner convicted of failing to Yes LOSS
States, 417 U.S. report for the draft get a new hearing
333 (1974) based on intervening change in law
(Gutknecht)?
Cass v. United Can the military deny readjustment Yes WIN
States, 417 U.S. pay to a reservist who serves six
72 (1974) months less than the five years
required for such pay?
Musser v. United Are induction orders invalid if the No WIN
States, 414 U.S. local board refused to reopen the file
31 (1973) of a registrant claiming conscientious
objector (CO) status after orders were
issued?
Holtzman v. After federal district court N/A
Schlesinger, 414 permanently enjoined the U.S.
U.S. 1304 bombing of Cambodia as
(1973); unconstitutional (unauthorized by
Holtzman v. Congress), the government received a
Schlesinger, 414 stay of this order from the 2d Cir.;
U.S. 1316 Justice Marshall rejected plaintiffs'
(1973); appeal to vacate the 2d Cir. 's stay
Schlesinger v. (1304); Justice Douglas vacated 2d
Holtzman, 414 Cir. 's stay (1316); Justice Marshall
U.S. 1321 (1973) stayed district court's original
injunction (1321).
Gosa v. Mayden, Can the O'Callahan rule that courts- No--old case not WIN
413 U.S. 665 martial cannot be conducted for reopened
(1973) offenses not service-related apply
retroactively ?
Frontiero v. Can the military force female No LOSS
Richardson, 411 personnel to prove dependency of
U.S. 677 (1973) husbands, but presume dependency of
male personnel's wives?
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CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
Laird v. Tatum, Is military plan to gather information No-claim is WIN
408 U.S. 1 via surveillance to prevent domestic nonjusticiable
(1972) disturbances subject to a class action
challenge?
Flower v. United Can leaflet distributor previously No LOSS
States, 407 U.S. barred from an Army post be arrested
197 (1972) for distributing on a widely-used
public street within post limits?
Strait v. Laird, Can the military assert command via No-upheld Cal. LOSS
406 U.S. 341 an Indiana reservist personnel center discharge order
(1972) over a reservist domiciled in
California?
Fein v. Sel. Serv. Can a registrant reclassified in an No WIN
Sys. Local Bd. appeal he could not attend as 1-A
No. 7, 405 U.S. trejecting local CO grant) file pre-
365 (1972) induction challenge of appeal?
Parisi v. Should a civilian court stay its grant No LOSS
Davidson, 405 of a habeas petition in CO claim
U.S. 34 (1972) pending resolution of subsequent
court-martial?
Lopez v. United Is CO applicant arguing for a post- Yes-def ordered N/A
States, 404 U.S. induction hearing on CO status (in released on
1213 (1971) light of Ehlert v. United States) recognizance
bailworthy? (ROR)
Clay v. United Can the government sustain a failure No LOSS
States, 403 U.S. to report conviction when it gives no
698 (1971) grounds for denial of CO status
appeal?
McGee v. United Can defendant claim unlawful No WIN
States, 402 U.S. rejection of CO claim on appeal when
479 (1971) he failed to appear before local board
to contest the denial?
Ehlert v. United Can a local board refuse to reopen the Yes, if other WIN
States, 402 U.S. status of registrant claiming CO after forums exist
99 (1971) induction notice was sent, but before
induction?
Schlanger v. Can an Air Force cadet arguing he No WIN
Seamans, 401 was removed from officer training for
U.S. 487 (1971) his political activities sue for breach of
employment?
Gillette v. Can the government refuse to grant Yes WIN
United States, "selective" CO status (objection to a
401 U.S. 437 particular war) and insist on
(1971) objection only to all war?
Relford v. Does the O'Callahan rule apply No-court-martial WIN
Commandant when offenses arguably not service- allowed
U.S. Disciplinary related are committed on the military
Barracks, 401 base?
U.S. 355 (1971)
United States v. Is the rule barring registrants to No WIN
Weller, 401 U.S. appear before draft boards with
254 (1971) counsel "inextricably intertwined"
with statute jurisdictionally?
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CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
United States v. Is CO's jury conviction, which was No LOSS
Sisson, 399 U.S. set aside by the trial judge, subject to
267 (1970) appeal by the government?
Mulloy v. United Must a draft board reopen a CO case Yes LOSS
States, 398 U.S. if the registrant makes factual
410 (1970) statements not previously offered that
would have merited CO status?
Welsh v. United Can CO status be conditioned upon No LOSS
States, 398 U.S. religious objections to war, denying
333 (1970) eligibility for ethical and spiritual
objections to war?
Schacht v. Can government arrest an antiwar No LOSS
United States, protestor who wears his uniform while
398 U.S. 58 acting in a protest skit that tends to
(1970) discredit the Armed Forces?
Toussie v. Is failing to register for the draft a Ends on initial LOSS
United States, continuing offense, or one that ends failure
397 U.S. 112 upon initial failure, for statute of
(1970) limitations purposes?
Jones v. AWOL CO claimant's request for stay Stay granted N/A
Lemond, 396 barring the Navy from holding him
U.S. 1227 (1969) in the brig and ordering him held in
open restricted barracks.
Scaggs v. Larsen, Renewed reservist charging violation Ordered ROR N/A
396 U.S. 1206 of enlistment contract requested a
(1969) release pending appeal of habeas
denial.
Breen v. Sel. Can a student deferee who Yes LOSS
Serv. Bd. Local surrendered his draft card in protest
No. 16, 396 U.S. receive pre-induction review of his
460 (1970) delinquency reclassication?
Gutknecht v. Can the Selective Service System No-this is LOSS
United States, accelerate the induction status of punitive
396 U.S. 295 delinquent CO registrants?
(1970)
Noyd v. Bond, Must service personnel exhaust all Yes WIN
395 U.S. 683 military remedies before appealing
(1969) military convictions in civilian
courts?
O'Callahan v. Can the military court-martial service No LOSS
Parker, 395 U.S. personnel for offenses that are not
258 (1969) service-related?
McKart v. Can the government revoke "sole No LOSS
United States, surviving son" exemption upon
395 U.S. 185 subsequent death of only living
(1969) parent?
United States v. In collateral attack on court-martial No WIN
Augenblick, 393 (made in Court of Claims suit for
U.S. 348 (1968) back pay), are evidentiary defects
constitutional errors?
Clark v. Gabriel, Can appeals of denial of CO status Yes WIN




CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
Oestereich v. Can an exempt divinity student who No LOSS
Sel. Serv. Sys. returned his draft card in protest be
Local Bd. No. reclassified as service-eligible?
11, 393 U.S. 233
(1968)
United States v. Does jailing an antiwar protestor for No WIN
O'Brien, 391 burning his draft card (and thus
U.S. 367 (1968) threatening administration of draft
system) violate the First Amendment?
Md. ex rel. Levin Is the United States liable for the No WIN
v. United States, negligence of a Maryland National
381 U.S. 41 Guard pilot who collided with a
(1965) civilian airliner?
United States v. Does the belief in a "Supreme Being" No LOSS
Seeger, 380 U.S. requirement condition CO status
163 (1965) eligibility upon membership in a
religious sect?
Beard v. Stahr, Can officer whose discharge was No WIN
370 U.S. 41 recommended to the Secretary of Army
(1962) by an inquiry board appeal discharge
before the Secretary acts?
Bell v. United Are former POWs who fraternized Yes LOSS
States, 366 U.S. with the enemy while in captivity in
393 (1961) Korea and later refused repatriation
entitled to back pay?
Gonzales v. Was failure to provide CO claimant a No WIN
United States, hearing officer's report and other
364 U.S. 59 evidence denial of due process in
(1960) failure to report the trial?
McElroy v. Can a civilian employee of the Armed No LOSS
United States ex Forces be court-martialed for a crime
rel. Guagliardo, committed overseas?
361 U.S. 281
(1960)
Grisham v. Can a civilian employee of the Armed No LOSS
Hagan, 361 U.S. Forces be court-martialed for a capital
278 (1960) crime committed overseas?
Kinsella v. Can a soldier's wife be court- No LOSS
Singleton, 361 martialed for a crime committed while
U.S. 234 (1960) accompanying her husband overseas?
Howard v. Are officer's comments about fellow Yes WIN
Lyons, 360 U.S. servicemen, submitted to Congress as
593 (1959) part of official duties, privileged in a
libel suit?
Tak Shan Fong Does subsequent military service No WIN
v. United States, render irrelevant an initial failure to
359 U.S. 102 enter the United States lawfully in an
(1959) application for citizenship?
Lee v. Madigan, Is a crime committed after the end of Yes-cannot court- LOSS
358 U.S. 228 hostilities but before the termination of martial
(1959) the war proclaimed by the president
"in time of peace"?
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CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
Nishikawa v. Did the government prove the No LOSS
Dulles, 356 U.S. voluntary enlistment into Japanese
129 (1958) army of a U.S. citizen and Japanese
national claiming he was conscripted?
Trop v. Dulles, Can wartime desertion from the No LOSS
356 U.S. 86 military be used as the basis for
(1958) revoking U.S. citizenship?
Harmon v. Can Secretary of the Army issue less No LOSS
Brucker, 355 than "honorable" discharges based on
U.S. 579 (1958) activities prior to induction?
Wilson v. Girard, Can the Army hand over an Yes WIN
354 U.S. 524 American soldier to foreign authorities
(1957) to prosecute a crime the soldier
committed there?
Reid v. Covert, Can civilian dependents of overseas No LOSS
354 U.S. I service personnel be court-martialed
(1957) for crimes committed overseas?
Johnston v. If CO's refuse to report for assigned District they were WIN
United States, civilian work, is venue for their to report to
351 U.S. 215 failure their home district or the
(1956) district they were to report to?
United States ex Can a former serviceman be No LOSS
rel Toth v. retroactively court-martialed after
Quarles, 350 discharge for crime committed while in
U.S. 11 (1955) service?
Gonzales v. Must the government furnish a CO Yes LOSS
United States, claimant with a copy of the DOJ
348 U.S. 407 recommendation to deny submitted to
(1955) local board?
Simmons v. Can the government refuse to furnish No LOSS
United States, a CO claimant with a summary of
348 U.S. 397 adverse information at hearing?
(1955)
Sicurella v. Can CO status be denied if the No LOSS
United States, claimant professes a willingness to
348 U.S. 385 engage in a spiritual fight for his
(1955) religious beliefs?
Witmer v. Can denials of CO status that have No WIN
United States, basis in fact for administrative
348 U.S. 375 decision be overturned by courts?
(1955)
Dickinson v. Does an incidental amount of secular No LOSS
United States, employment invalidate a clergy draft
346 U.S. 389 exemption?
(1953)
United States v. Are CO claimants entitled to see their No WIN
Nugent, 346 FBI files in a DOJ hearing?
U.S. 1 (1953)
Orloff v. Can the military deny an Army doctor Yes WIN
Willoughby, 345 an officer's commission if the doctor




CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
United States v. Can the government cite national Yes WIN
Reynolds, 345 security concerns as a reason to
U.S. 1 (1953) withhold documents in a tort suit
filed over the crash of Army jet?
United States v. Is the destruction of private property No WIN
Caltex during wartime so that it does not
(Philippines), fall into enemy hands a taking
Inc., 344 U.S. requiring compensation?
149 (1952)
Madsen v. Can the spouse of a serviceman in Yes WIN
Kinsella, 343 Germany be tried by the Occupation
U.S. 341 (1952) Court for a crime committed in
Germany?
Robertson v. Did the Army Disability Review Board Yes WIN
Chambers, 341 properly rely on service records for its
U.S. 37 (1951) decision to discharge an officer?
Gusik v. Must servicemen pursue a new Yes WIN
Schilder, 340 military remedy before seeking habeas
U.S. 128 (1950) corpus even if the remedy was created
after the case began?
Whelchel v. Is habeas corpus available to a court- No WIN
McDonald, 340 martialed serviceman because of the
U.S. 122 (1950) way the tribunal handled his insanity
plea?
Snyder v. Buck, Did the failure to substitute in timely Yes WIN
340 U.S. 15 fashion new Navy paymaster as party
(1950) void suit for death gratuity?
Johnson v. Are German nationals arrested for No WIN
Eisentrager, 339 crimes committed in China during
U.S. 763 (1950) wartime entitled to habeas corpus
relief?
United States v. Can a widow of a flight engineer No WIN
Spelar, 338 U.S. killed at Newfoundland Air Force
217 (1949) Base recover tort damages against the
United States over managing the
base?
Hirota v. Is the military tribunal in occupied No WIN
MacArthur, 338 Japan set up by General MacArthur
U.S. 197 (1948) subject to Supreme Court review?
Kimball Laundry Must the United States provide Yes LOSS
Co. v. United compensation for the lost "trade
States, 338 U.S. routes" of laundry it condemned for
1 (1949) use during World War II?
Brooks v. United Are estates of servicemen killed when Yes LOSS
States, 337 U.S. an Army truck hit their car entitled to
49 (1949) tort recovery against the Army?
Humphrey v. Does lack of pretrial investigation No WIN
Smith, 336 U.S. deprive a court-martial of jurisdiction
695 (1949) or open it up to habeas corpus
review?
Wade v. Hunter, Does double jeopardy attach when a No WIN
336 U.S. 684 court-martial has to be cancelled
(1949) because of distance from all witnesses?
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CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
United States ex Can Navy court-martial a reenlisted No LOSS
rel. Hirshberg v. soldier for an offense committed
Cooke, 336 U.S. during the first term of enlistment if
210 he was then discharged?
Hilton v. Must the government consider length No WIN
Sullivan, 334 of service in determining the
U.S. 323 (1948) employment status of returning
veteran employees?
Mogall v. United Is an employer required to furnish a No LOSS
States, 333 U.S. draft board information about an
424 (1948) employee that might result in a
different draft classification?
Mitchell v. Are former temporary workers in the No WIN
Cohen, 333 U.S. Volunteer Port Security Force "ex-
411 (1948) servicemen"for the purposes of
veterans'job preferences?
Cox v. United Was draft board's refusal to grant Yes WIN
States, 332 U.S. ministerial exemptions to Jehovah's
442 (1947) Witnesses appropriate?
United States v. Can the government recover tort No LOSS
Standard Oil Co. damages for compensation it had to
of Cal., 332 U.S. pay to a serviceman injured ry one of
301 (1947) the company's trucks?
Sunal v. Large, Can a registrant who did not appeal No WIN
332 U.S. 174 improper denial of a defense to
(1947) refusing to serve obtain habeas corpus
relief?
United States v. Does a court-martial conviction No WIN
Bayer, 331 U.S. preclude subsequent civil recovery by
532 (1947) the United States in an action over
depriving the United States of an
officer?
Patterson v. Is an Army draftee sent back before No WIN
Lamb, 329 U.S. induction due to the cessation of
539 (1947) hostilities entitled to an honorable
discharge?
Gibson v. United Is a CO claimant required to report to No LOSS
States, 329 U.S. civilian camp in order to complete the
338 (1947) administrative process and offer CO
defense?
Eagles v. United Did the draft board illegally induct a No WIN
States ex rel. rabbinical student into the Army
Horowitz, 329 when it determined that his rabbinical
U.S. 317 (1947) study was insincere?
Eagles v. United Did the draft board illegally induct a No WIN
States ex rel rabbinical student into the Army
Samuels, 329 when it determined that his rabbinical
U.S. 304 (1947) study was insincere?
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CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
United States v. Is the venue for a failure to report a Where refusal WIN
Anderson, 328 prosecution the district where the draft occurred
U.S. 699 (1946) board was located or where the
induction oath was refused?
United States v. Is the government's use of a local Yes LOSS
Causby, 328 U.S. airfield such that it ruined a chicken
256 (1946) farm a "taking" requiring
compensation?
Duncan v. Did military tribunals in Hawaii No LOSS
Kahanamoku, have the power to convict civilians?
327 U.S. 304
(1946)
Estep v. United Are rejected applicants for service Yes LOSS
States, 327 U.S. exemptions entitled to full judicial
114 (1946) review of the denial?
In re Yamashita, Can a former general of the Japanese Yes WIN
327 U.S. 1 Army accused of allowing his troops
(1946) to commit atrocities be tried by a U.S.
military tribunal?
Mine Safety Can a contractor maintain suit No WIN
Appliances Co. against the Navy Undersecretary
v. Forrestal, 326 personally as means of preventing
U.S. 371 (1945) him from stopping gov't payments?
Keegan v. Was there sufficient evidence to No LOSS
United States, convict members of German-American
325 U.S. 478 Bund of conspiracy to counsel for
(1945) draft evasion?
Korematsu v. Can American citizen of Japanese Yes WIN
United States, ancestry be convicted for refusing to
323 U.S. 214 obey an exclusion order during World
(1944) War II?
Billings v. Is a CO claimant who refuses to take Civilian LOSS
Truesdell, 321 the oath of induction subject to court- prosecution
U.S. 542 (1944) martial or civilian prosecution?
Falbo v. United Can a CO registrant who refused to No WIN
States, 320 U.S. perform alternative duties obtain
549 (1944) judicial review before induction?
Yasui v. United Can an American citizen of Japanese Yes WIN
States, 320 U.S. ancestry be convicted for refusing to
115 (1943) obey curfew orders during World War
II?
Hirabayashi v. Can an American citizen ofJapanese Yes WIN
United States, ancestry be convicted for refusing to
320 U.S. 81 obey curfew and relocation orders
(1943) during World War II?
Bartchy v. Is it enough that a draft registrant Yes LOSS
United States, furnish a draft board in good faith
319 U.S. 484 with a chain of forwarding addresses?
(1943)
Bowles v. United Can a rejected CO claimant challenge No WIN
States, 319 U.S. a denial by alleging that the board
33 (1943) misapplied statute?
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CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
Ex parte Quirin, Are suspected Nazi saboteurs properly Yes WIN
317 U.S. 1 tried before a military commission?
(1942)
United States v. If an Army officer seizes property No WIN
Goltra, 312 U.S. without proper authorization, can the
203 (1941) property owner sue the government?
United States v. Was the government allowed to deny Yes WIN
Dickerson, 310 a soldier a re-enlistment allowance?
U.S. 554 (1940)
Miguel v. Is the Comptroller General of the Yes LOSS
McCarl, 291 U.S. Army subject to a writ of mandamus
442 (1934) to deliver back pay?
United States ex Can landowners obtain a writ of No WIN
rel. Greathouse v mandamus from the Secretary of War
Dern, 289 U.S. to consummate a sale so that a wharf
352 (1933) can be built?
Surplus Trading Does a state relinquish its right to tax Yes WIN
Co. v. Cook, 281 improvements made on land within
U.S. 647 (1930) its borders sold to the U.S.
government for a military base?
United States v. Does the United States have the power Yes WIN
Unzeuta, 281 to prosecute a murder on a train car
U.S. 138 (1930) traveling through a military
reservation ?
Leonard v. Is a retired Marine who received No WIN
United States, longevity pay for wounds entitled to
279 U.S. 40 have his years on retired list counted
(1929) for base pay?
United States v. Was a lieutenant of the Staff Corps of Yes WIN
Lenson, 278 U.S. the Navy properly denied pay?
60 (1928)
Culver v. United Is a War College student entitled to Yes, though not as LOSS
States, 271 U.S. extra pay because he volunteered for much
315 (1926) flights?
Rogers v. United Can an Army major appeal forced No WIN
States, 270 U.S. retirement in civilian court, claiming
154 (1926) that the military tribunal denied him
a right to give evidence?
United States v. Was the United States liable for a Yes LOSS
Swift & Co., 270 contract for Army food signed for by
U.S. 124 (1926) the quartermaster officers?
Interocean Oil Can a company that contracted with No WIN
Co. v. United an Army officer knowing he needed
States, 270 U.S. confirmation from superiors recover
65 (1926) for breach of contract?
United States v. Is an Army officer entitled to count No WIN
Noce, 268 U.S. his service as a cadet at the U.S.
613 (1925) Military Academy in computing
longevity pay?
United States v. Can Army recover extra pay given to No LOSS
Royer, 268 U.S. an officer inadvertently promoted to
394 (1925) major when he should only have been
captain ?
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CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
United States v. Can the United States recover sea pay No LOSS
Moser, 266 U.S. against a captain in a dispute over
236 (1924) whether his cadet service was within
the "civil war"?
United States v. Is the commander of a domestic No WIN
Ferris, 265 U.S. military instruction camp "serving
165 (1924) with troops operating against an
enemy "for pay computation?
United States v. Did the Navy unlawfully withhold Yes LOSS
Gay, 264 U.S. pay from a retired warrant machinist
353 (1924) who had returned to Switzerland?
United States v. Can the Navy deduct "gratuity"pay No LOSS
Slaymaker, 263 for the uniforms of a Naval reservist
U.S. 94 (1923) who leaves the reserves to join the
regular Navy?
Denby v. Berry, Can the Navy Secretary be required by No WIN
263 U.S. 29 mandamus to revoke an order retiring
(1923) an officer to inactive duty?
United States v. Is additional pay for enlisted men in Yes LOSS
Luskey, 262 U.S. the Navy and Marines on flight
62 (1923) detail to be made irrespective of
number of flights made?
United States v. Are enlisted men in officer training No WIN
Rider, 261 U.S. entitled to the temporary pay increase
363 (1923) in the Signal Corps?
United States v. Was a yeoman in the Coast Guard No LOSS
Moran, 261 U.S. properly denied pay based on a
321 (1923) decision to fix pay grades by the
Secretary of the Navy?
United States v. Was a seaman in the Coast Guard No LOSS
Allen, 261 U.S. properly denied pay based on a
317 (1923) decision to fix pay grades ly the
Secretary of the Navy?
U.S. Grain Corp. Is a naval officer entitled to extra pay No LOSS
v. Phillips, 261 for transporting gold for a private
U.S. 106 (1923) corporation as part of his public
duty?
United States ex Can a military tribunal's No WIN
rel. Creary v. reclassification of an officer be
Weeks, 259 U.S. challenged in civilian court?
336 (1922)
United States. ex Can a military tribunal's No WIN
rel. French v. reclassification of an officer be
Weeks, 259 U.S. challenged in civilian court?
326 (1922)
Collins v. Must a habeas corpus appeal of a Yes WIN
McDonald, 258 court-martial be limited to the
U.S. 416 (1922) jurisdiction of the court-martial?
Wallace v. Can the president remove an Army Yes WIN
United States, officer by appointing another officer
257 U.S. 541 in his place with Senate consent?
(1922)
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CASE QUESTION OR ISSUE AT BAR DISPOSITION WIN OR LOSS?
Givens v. Zerbst, Was a court-martial properly Yes WIN
255 U.S. 11 convened?
(1921)
Kahn v. Is the number of officers that comprise No WIN
Anderson, 255 a court-martial panel subject to
U.S. 1 (1921) judicial review?
Cartas v. United Does the commander of a Navy ship's No WIN
States, 250 U.S. discretionary choice to take private
545 (1919) property onboard create a contract
obligation for the United States?
United States v. Was the United States within its Yes WIN
Babcock, 250 rights to refuse to compensate Army
U.S. 328 (1919) officers for private property losses?
Cox v. Wood, Is compulsory conscription Constitutional WIN
247 U.S. 3 constitutional or is it ruled out by the
(1918) Militia Clause?
Bethlehem Steel Did a company that continued to No WIN
Co. v. United make bond payments have the right of
States, 246 U.S. action against the United States, •
523 (1918) claiming they should have cancelled
bond?












Jones v. Perkins, Is the Selective Draft law Yes WIN
245 U.S. 390 constitutional?
(1918) _ _ _
Selective Draft Is the Selective Draft Law Yes WIN
Law Cases, 245 constitutional?
U.S. 366 (1918)
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APPENDIX B: SELECTED STATISTICAL BREAKDowNs OF MILITARY CASES
MILITARY'S OVERALL WIN-LOSS 118-60 (66.3%)
RECORD
WIN-LOSS RECORD IN DRAFT 16-17 (48.5%)
EXEMPTION CASES
1 7 5
Subcategory 1: exemption procedures 12-13 (48.0%)
Subcategoiy 2: exemption eligibility 4-4 (50.0%)
Overall win-loss record without draft 102-43 (70.3%)
exemption cases
WIN-LOSS RECORD IN SOLDIER 7-11 (38.9%)
PAY CASES
1 7 6
Overall win-loss record without soldier 11249 (69.6%)
pay cases
Overall win-loss record without soldier 95-32
pay or draft exemption cases (74.8%)
WIN-LOSS RECORD IN COURT- 29-10 (74.4%)
MARTIAL CASES
1 7 7
Court-martial of military esonnel 28-6 (82.4%)
Court martial of civilians 7 8  1-4 (20.0%)
WIN-LOSS RECORD IN TORT 8-3 (72.8%)
LIABILITY CASES
1 7 9
175. Cases in which challenges were launched against either the substantive decisions of
draft boards or other bodies assessing eligibility for conscientious objector status or other
exemption from military service, or the procedures to be used in the relevant proceedings.
This list thus includes the following cases (in reverse chronological order): Musser, Fein,
Parisi, Clay, McGee, Ehlert, Gillette, Sisson, Mulloy, Welsh, Breen, Gutknecht, McKart, Clark,
Oestereich, Seeger, Gonzales (1960), Johnston, Gonzales (1955), Simmons, Sicurella, Witmer,
Dickinson, Nugent, Mogal Cox, Sunal, Gibson, Horowitz, Samuels, Estep, Billings, Falbo, Bowles.
176. In reverse chronological order: Cass, Bell, Dickerson, Miguel Leonard, Lenson, Culver,
Noce, Royer, Moser, Gay, Ferris, Slaymaker, Luskey, Rider, Moran, Allen, Grain.
177. Also included are cases involving trial by military tribunal or Occupation Court.
This category does not include conscientious objector (CO) cases that ended up as court-
martials; the CO cases and these cases have been coded in mutually exclusive fashion. This
list thus includes the following cases (in reverse chronological order): Scheffer, Loving,
Solorio, Peeples, Middendorf McLucas, Councilman, Parker, Gosa, Parisi, Relford, Noyd,
O'Callahan, Augenblick, Grisham, McElroy, Singleton, Madigan, Covert, Toth, Madsen, Gusik,
Whelchel, Eisentrager, Hirota, Humphrey, Wade, Hirshberg, Bayer, Anderson, Kahanamoku,
Yamashita, Quirin, Unzeuta, French, Creay, Collins, Givens, Kahn. As explained earlier,
because these cases are being used as a means of explaining the decisions in Hamdi, Rasul,
and Padilla, those three cases have been omitted from the tabulation within this cluster.
178. In reverse chronological order: Grisham, McElroy, Singleton, Madsen, Kahanamoku.
179. In reverse chronological order: Boyle, Johnson, Shearer, Weber Aircraft, Lockheed
Aircraft, Romero-Barcelo, Stencel, Levin, Reynolds, Spelar, Brooks.
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MILITARY'S WIN-LOSS RECORD BY
CHIEF JUSTICESHIP
180
Edward White (1918-1921) (Sel. Draft 11-0 (100.0%)
Law --s Givens)
William Howard Taft (1921-1930) 12-10 (54.5%)
(Wallace -* Leonard)
Charles Evans Hughes (1930-1941) 5-1 (83.3%)
(Unzeuta -+ Goltra)
Harlan Fiske Stone (1941-1946) 8-5 (61.5%)
(Quirin -4 Kahanamoku)
Fred Vinson (1946-1953) (Causby - 22-7 (75.9%)
Or/off)
Earl Warren (1953-1969) (Nugent -4 12-15 (44.4%)
Noyd)
Warren Burger (1970-1986) (Gutknecht 32-19 (62.7%)
Goldman)
William Rehnquist (1986-2005) (U.S. 16-3 (84.2%)
v. Johnson -- Hamdi)
180. Opinions are categorized opinions here by the date they were announced. This
category is merely a chronological tracking; it does not track individual Justices' votes (that
will be a future project).
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